Commonwealth v. Laguer

448 Mass. 585 (2007) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · March 23, 2007

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Benjamin LaGuer’s motion for a new trial based on the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose a fingerprint report. The court held that the undisclosed fingerprints were not shown to be exculpatory because there was no evidence linking them to another perpetrator or establishing when they were placed on the telephone. It also concluded that, even assuming the report was exculpatory, LaGuer had not demonstrated a substantial basis for prejudice from its nondisclosure.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Cowin, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
March 23, 2007
Procedural posture
The defendant appealed from the denial of a motion for a new trial and a subsequent motion for reconsideration based on alleged suppression of exculpatory fingerprint evidence and loss or destruction of the fingerprints and a portion of the fingerprint report. The Appeals Court affirmed, and the Supreme Judicial Court allowed further appellate review.
Standard of review
When a judge deciding a motion for a new trial was not the trial judge, the appellate court regards itself as in as good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial record. For a constitutionally based new-trial claim, the court independently reviews the ultimate factual and legal conclusions.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Benjamin Laguer v. Commonwealth
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

post-conviction reliefdue processdiscovery criminalevidencecriminal procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedurepost-conviction reliefconstitutional lawevidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Commonwealth violated the defendant's Federal and State constitutional due-process rights by failing to disclose a fingerprint report stating that several fingerprints on the victim's telephone did not match the defendant.
  2. Whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) because the undisclosed fingerprint evidence would have materially aided his defense.
  3. Whether the loss or destruction of the fingerprints and possibly the second page of the fingerprint report violated the defendant's right to a fair trial under the rule stated in Commonwealth v. Olszewski.

Holdings

  1. The defendant was not entitled to a new trial because he failed to establish that the undisclosed fingerprint evidence was exculpatory as to him. The evidence merely indicated that fingerprints on the telephone did not match the defendant, a fact already disclosed and used at trial, and there was no concrete basis to infer that the additional fingerprints belonged to the actual perpetrator.
  2. Even assuming the fingerprint report was exculpatory, the defendant failed to demonstrate a substantial basis for claiming prejudice from its nondisclosure, because there was no reasonable possibility that the additional fingerprint information would have influenced the jury.
  3. The loss or destruction of the fingerprints and possibly the second page of the report did not require a new trial or dismissal because the defendant failed to show, based on concrete evidence rather than speculation, a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would have been favorable.

Key quotations

The Brady obligation comprehends evidence which provides some significant aid to the defendant’s case, whether it furnishes corroboration of the defendant’s story, calls into question a material, although not indispensable, element of the prosecution’s version of the events, or challenges the credibility of a key prosecution witness. (at 594-595)
A defendant claiming to have been deprived of potentially exculpatory evidence has the initial burden of establishing a reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence and not on mere speculation, that the Commonwealth’s actions deprived him of evidence that would have been favorable to his case. (at 602)

Factual background

The defendant was convicted of violently raping and robbing a woman in her apartment, which was next door to the apartment where he was staying. The victim identified him after the attack, and the prosecution presented circumstantial evidence including his proximity to the victim, clothing matching her description, a fresh scratch on his back, access to the victim's keys, and weaknesses in his alibi. Before trial, the prosecutor informed defense counsel that a fingerprint recovered from the telephone did not match the defendant; many years later, the defendant obtained a report indicating that several fingerprints had been found on the telephone and none matched him, but the fingerprints and possibly the report's second page were unavailable.

Procedural history

The defendant was convicted in 1984 of aggravated rape, unarmed robbery, breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony, and assault and battery. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. After obtaining part of a previously undisclosed fingerprint report in 2001, the defendant moved for a new trial or dismissal of the indictments. A Superior Court judge denied relief, the Appeals Court affirmed, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial.

Court Document

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