Commonwealth v. Merry

453 Mass. 653 (2009) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · April 16, 2009

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for negligent vehicular homicide, so double jeopardy did not bar retrial. The court nevertheless affirmed the order granting a new trial because the Commonwealth failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence concerning expert opinions about damage to the vehicle’s windshield. The court also concluded that the prosecutor’s conduct, including improper closing-argument statements, did not warrant dismissal of the charges.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Cowin, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
April 16, 2009
Procedural posture
The defendant petitioned under G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking to bar retrial on double-jeopardy grounds or, alternatively, to dismiss the charges for prosecutorial misconduct. A single justice reserved and reported the motion to the full Supreme Judicial Court. The defendant also appealed the denial of his motions for a required finding of not guilty.
Standard of review
For sufficiency, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and asked whether a rational jury could find each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reviewed the motion judge's factual findings concerning prosecutorial conduct for support in the record and did not disturb findings that were warranted.
Precedential value
Published Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Merry v. Commonwealth
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal proceduredouble jeopardyevidenceprosecutorial misconductpost-conviction relief

Practice areas

criminal procedurecriminal appellate practiceevidenceprosecutorial misconductdouble jeopardy

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the evidence at the original trial was legally sufficient to support convictions for operating a motor vehicle negligently and causing death, such that retrial would not violate double jeopardy.
  2. Whether the Commonwealth's delayed disclosure of material exculpatory evidence required dismissal of the charge rather than a new trial.
  3. Whether the prosecutor's closing argument and alleged failure to disclose or investigate evidence constituted misconduct so egregious that dismissal was required and retrial barred.

Holdings

  1. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated the cruiser negligently on a public way and caused the victim's death. Because the original evidence was legally sufficient, retrial was not barred by double jeopardy.
  2. The accident-reconstruction expert's opinion concerning the cause of the windshield damage and the absence of evidence that the defendant's head struck the windshield was material and exculpatory; its nondisclosure required a new trial.
  3. The prosecutor's closing argument included improper statements, but the conduct was not sufficiently egregious to require dismissal. The record did not show that the Commonwealth intended to provoke a mistrial, that a fair retrial was impossible, or that dismissal was necessary to deter comparable misconduct.

Key quotations

Under the familiar Latimore standard, the evidence is sufficient to reach the jury and a motion for a required finding of not guilty is properly denied if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, would permit a rational jury to find each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (453 Mass. at 660)
We agree with the judge who conducted the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial that Ryan's opinion was material and exculpatory. (453 Mass. at 664)
We have delineated limited circumstances for dismissing a complaint due to prosecutorial misconduct (453 Mass. at 666)
There was sufficient evidence introduced at the defendant's trial for a rational jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation. (453 Mass. at 668)

Factual background

The defendant, a Beverly police officer, was driving a police cruiser when it accelerated up Cabot Street and struck a parked vehicle, killing its occupant. Accident-reconstruction evidence showed that the cruiser traveled approximately 474 to 526 feet, reached approximately fifty-two to fifty-five miles per hour in a thirty-mile-per-hour zone, and had its accelerator nearly fully depressed before impact. The defense asserted that the defendant suffered a seizure, while the Commonwealth argued that he negligently operated the vehicle. After trial, the Commonwealth disclosed that its accident-reconstruction expert believed the windshield damage was most likely caused by the crash and found no evidence that the defendant's head had struck the windshield; the trial judge found that this information was material and exculpatory.

Procedural history

A District Court jury convicted the defendant of negligent motor vehicle homicide. The trial judge allowed the defendant's motion for a new trial after finding that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence concerning the accident reconstruction expert's opinion about windshield damage. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order allowing a new trial, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not warrant dismissal or bar retrial.

Remand instructions

The defendant may be retried. The order allowing the motion for a new trial was affirmed; dismissal was not required.

Court Document

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