Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that State Police General Order TRF-15, governing sobriety checkpoints, did not facially permit unconstitutional discretion in diverting vehicles to secondary screening when officers had reasonable suspicion of an OUI or other violation. The court also held that written instructions governing the particular checkpoint adequately limited initial officer questioning, reversed the order suppressing evidence, and remanded for further proceedings regarding compliance with the guidelines.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether TRF-15 facially permitted an unconstitutional amount of discretion in selecting motorists for diversion from initial sobriety-checkpoint screening to secondary screening.
- Whether the written guidelines governing the checkpoint sufficiently limited officers' discretion to question motorists during the initial screening when there was no indication of intoxication.
Holdings
- TRF-15 falls within constitutional parameters because it permits diversion to secondary screening only when the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that the operator or a passenger has committed an operating-under-the-influence offense or another violation of law.
- The TRF-15 guidelines, supplemented by the written operations-plan instructions for this checkpoint, appropriately limited the discretion of initial screening officers and therefore satisfied constitutional requirements.
Key quotations
“Secondary screening, as permitted under TRF-15, in contrast, is not a seizure without individualized suspicion, because it must be predicated on reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that the driver is operating while under the influence or that the driver or any passenger has otherwise committed a violation of law.” (454 Mass. at 325)
“We shall evaluate the lawfulness of a secondary screening, or any Terry stop, based on whether the evidence supports the officer’s finding of reasonable articulable suspicion, not on whether the police officer had the discretion, despite reasonable suspicion, to forgo or defer a Terry stop.” (454 Mass. at 326)
“We conclude that the Commonwealth has satisfied its burden of establishing that the roadblock in this case was governed by lawful guidelines.” (454 Mass. at 329)
Factual background
On July 27, 2007, Robert R. Murphy was stopped at a State Police sobriety checkpoint on Quincy Shore Drive that operated from 11 p.m. until 3 a.m. Seventeen troopers were instructed to stop every approaching vehicle, conduct a brief initial contact of no more than one minute, and observe operators for signs of impairment. TRF-15 permitted diversion to secondary screening when an officer had reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the operator or a passenger had committed an operating-under-the-influence offense or another legal violation. The checkpoint's written operations plan further instructed officers to make additional inquiry at the designated secondary area if they observed an articulable sign of possible intoxication, impairment, or contraband.
Procedural history
A District Court judge allowed Murphy's motion to suppress, ruling that State Police General Order TRF-15 was facially unconstitutional because it permitted arbitrary discretion in diverting motorists from initial screening to secondary screening. The judge denied reconsideration without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the suppression order and remanded for further proceedings, including determination whether the officers actually complied with the written guidelines.
Remand instructions
The District Court must conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including resolving the factual question whether the initial screening officer's inquiry of Murphy exceeded the parameters established in Major Concannon's directive and addressing any remaining suppression issues.