Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a person incarcerated solely under a facially unconstitutional sentencing statute is not a “prisoner” eligible for civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person under G. L. c. 123A, § 12(b). Because the plaintiff’s lifetime community parole sentence was unconstitutional, the Commonwealth lacked the statutory custodial prerequisite to initiate sexually dangerous person proceedings. The court remanded for dismissal of the Commonwealth’s petition.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a person incarcerated solely for violating the terms of a sentence imposed under a facially unconstitutional statute is a "prisoner" within the meaning of G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b).
- Whether the Commonwealth could initiate sexually dangerous person commitment proceedings under § 12 (b) based on the plaintiff's custody under the constitutionally invalid lifetime-parole sentence.
- Whether extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was an appropriate avenue for the plaintiff's challenge.
Holdings
- A person incarcerated for violating the terms of an unconstitutional sentence is not a "prisoner" for purposes of G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), and therefore cannot be subjected to sexually dangerous person commitment proceedings under that provision.
- Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was appropriate because the plaintiff asserted a substantial deprivation of physical liberty that could not be effectively remedied through ordinary appellate procedures.
Key quotations
“Because G. L. c. 123A authorizes substantial and indefinite deprivations of liberty, we construe § 12 (b) to mean that an individual is a “prisoner” for purposes of the statute only if he is serving a sentence imposed under a statute that is constitutionally sound.” (458 Mass. at 189)
“Accordingly, we conclude that a person incarcerated under a facially unconstitutional statute is not a “prisoner” for purposes of the threshold requirement for civil commitment as an SDP under § 12 (b), and that the statute does not authorize the Commonwealth to initiate SDP proceedings against him.” (458 Mass. at 190)
Factual background
The plaintiff pleaded guilty to indecent assault and battery and received a sentence including lifetime community parole supervision. After repeated parole violations, he was incarcerated for a fourth violation. The Supreme Judicial Court had declared the lifetime-parole sentencing procedures facially unconstitutional, and the District Attorney conceded that the plaintiff's sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him. While the plaintiff remained incarcerated and before his sentence was formally vacated, the Commonwealth filed a petition to commit him indefinitely as a sexually dangerous person.
Procedural history
The plaintiff was serving a period of incarceration for violating lifetime community parole imposed under G. L. c. 275, § 18. After Commonwealth v. Pagan declared the relevant lifetime-parole sentencing procedures facially unconstitutional, the plaintiff moved to vacate his sentence, and the District Attorney conceded its invalidity. Before the motion was allowed, the Commonwealth filed a petition under G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), seeking to commit him as a sexually dangerous person. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff was not a statutory prisoner and remanded for dismissal of the petition.
Remand instructions
The Superior Court was directed to enter an order dismissing the Commonwealth's petition under G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b).