Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for deliberately premeditated murder. The court rejected challenges concerning hearsay evidence, a late-disclosed witness and references to a prior trial, the prosecutor’s closing argument and timeline chart, the requested Bowden instruction, and the deliberate-premeditation instruction. The court also declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the victim's statements to her daughter concerning the defendant's attempt to run her over and the events causing her distress were improperly admitted.
- Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by denying a mistrial or motion to strike based on a witness's late-disclosed and changed testimony and references to the defendant's prior trial.
- Whether the prosecutor's closing argument and timeline chart misstated the evidence or improperly urged conviction on a burden less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Whether the defendant was entitled to a so-called Bowden instruction concerning alleged inadequacies in the police investigation.
- Whether the jury instruction on deliberate premeditation was legally adequate.
- Whether the record warranted relief under the Supreme Judicial Court's power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- Although the prosecutor's question improperly called for speculation about the defendant's state of mind, the victim's answer was admissible as an excited utterance when viewed as describing the event causing her crying and screaming. The admission did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial or motion to strike. The defendant failed to show bad faith, a discovery violation, or prejudice resulting from the late disclosure and the witness's testimony.
- The prosecutor's closing argument was grounded in the evidence, did not misrepresent testimony, and did not improperly diminish the reasonable-doubt standard. The timeline chart was a permissible aid to the argument and was not shown to be inaccurate.
- The defendant was not entitled to a specific Bowden instruction. Bowden permits a defendant to present evidence and argument concerning inadequacies in the police investigation but does not create a defense, an element, or a requirement that the judge give a particular instruction.
- The deliberate-premeditation instruction was not erroneous because the judge gave the approved instruction from the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide.
Key quotations
“Bowden does not create a “defense” in the sense that it creates an element of proof that the Commonwealth must prove or disprove beyond a reasonable doubt, such that a particular instruction is required.” (23)
“Whether the evidence was incriminating, exculpatory, or both, where, as here, there has been disclosure but no evidence of bad faith, the question becomes whether the defendant had sufficient time to adjust to the disclosure in shaping and preparing his defense.” (20)
Factual background
The victim and the defendant, her estranged husband, had separated, and the victim told their daughter that she intended to file for divorce and that her boyfriend would move into her apartment. The defendant had previously controlled and physically abused the victim and had threatened to kill her if she left him. The victim was found strangled in her apartment on May 2, 2000, after witnesses placed the defendant and his white van near the apartment during the relevant period. The defendant claimed an alibi involving a Home Depot purchase and work at a client's home in Waltham, but the prosecution argued that a gap in the timeline allowed him to commit the murder.
Procedural history
The defendant's first murder conviction was affirmed. His motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was denied; the Supreme Judicial Court reversed and ordered a new trial. After retrial, the defendant was again convicted of deliberately premeditated murder. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment and declined under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial.