Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Levi Omar Alcantara’s convictions for murder in the first degree, assault with intent to kill, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The court addressed evidentiary issues involving consciousness of guilt, excited utterances, third-party culprit evidence, and the adequacy of the police investigation, concluding that no reversible error occurred.
Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Cordy, J.; Gants, C.J.; Spina, J.; Botsford, J.; Hines, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
June 1, 2015
Docket number
SJC-11468
Procedural posture
The defendant appealed convictions for murder in the first degree, assault with intent to kill, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, challenging several evidentiary rulings made during trial. The Supreme Judicial Court also conducted its required review under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E.
Standard of review
Preserved instructional and evidentiary claims were reviewed for prejudicial error. The exclusion of Bowden-defense evidence was reviewed for abuse of discretion, as was the limitation of cross-examination and the determination of whether the prerequisites for an excited utterance were met. The denial of access to privileged treatment records was reviewed under the good-cause standard.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Parties
Levi Omar Alcantara v. Commonwealth
Disposition
affirmed
Topics
hearsayevidenceprivilegeimpeachmentcriminal procedure
Practice areas
criminal lawevidencemurdercriminal procedure
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial judge improperly permitted the defendant's custodial statement, which had initially been admitted only to challenge the police investigation, to be considered in connection with consciousness of guilt.
- Whether the neighbor's 911 statement that 'some guy' attacked Jesus was inadmissible hearsay or totem-pole hearsay.
- Whether the trial judge improperly excluded hearsay and other evidence offered to support a third-party culprit defense involving Santos and other alleged assailants.
- Whether the trial judge improperly excluded evidence offered to support a Bowden defense alleging an inadequate police investigation.
- Whether the defendant established good cause for access to Christopher's statutorily privileged psychiatric treatment records.
- Whether the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination concerning Christopher's alleged use of prescription antipsychotic medication.
- Whether the Supreme Judicial Court should exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E, to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial.
Holdings
- A consciousness-of-guilt instruction is permissible when evidence of false statements to police, together with other evidence tending to establish their falsity, supports an inference of guilt. Any error in allowing the defendant's custodial statement to be considered for that purpose was not prejudicial because the prosecutor relied on other statements and conduct, and the jury was presumed to follow the prior limiting instruction.
- The neighbor's 911 statement was admissible as an excited utterance, including the reference to 'some guy,' because the circumstances supported a reasonable inference that the statement derived from Jesus's contemporaneous excited statement while he was bleeding and seeking help.
- A defendant may present evidence that another person committed the crime, but hearsay evidence lacking an exception is admissible only when it is relevant, nonprejudicial, nonconfusing, and supported by substantial connecting links to the crime. The excluded statements concerning Santos and the four unidentified assailants did not satisfy those requirements.
- A defendant may challenge the adequacy of a police investigation, but the trial judge may exclude proposed Bowden evidence when its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or diversion into collateral matters. The judge did not abuse that discretion here.
- A party seeking access to statutorily privileged treatment records must establish good cause by showing that the records are evidentiary and relevant, not reasonably procurable through due diligence, necessary for trial preparation, and sought in good faith rather than as a fishing expedition. A speculative possibility that records might contain useful impeachment material is insufficient.
- Evidence of a witness's drug or medication use is admissible for impeachment only when the proponent establishes a connection between the use and the witness's ability to perceive, remember, or testify accurately. The defendant failed to make that showing concerning Christopher's alleged antipsychotic medication.
Key quotations
“A defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence that another may have committed the crime.” (at 16-17)
“Defendants have the right to base their defense on the failure of police adequately to investigate a murder in order to raise the issue of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the minds of the jury.” (at 20-21)
“A party seeking to access statutorily privileged treatment records must: "establish good cause, satisfied by a showing '(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition."'” (at 24)
Factual background
Maria Sastre was beaten to death with a hammer in her Lawrence home, and her son Jesus was also attacked but escaped. Jesus and Christopher identified the defendant, Levi Omar Alcantara, as the assailant; the defendant's DNA was found on the hammer, and stains on his clothing were consistent with the DNA of Maria and Jesus. The defendant claimed that four men attacked him and Maria, but the jury convicted him of murder in the first degree and related assault offenses.
Procedural history
Indictments were returned in the Superior Court Department on June 7, 2006. Following a jury trial before Leila R. Kern, J., the defendant was convicted of all charges, including murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court found no reversible error and no basis under § 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.
Court Document
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