Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the prima facie evidence provision in G. L. c. 266, § 37, and the corresponding jury instruction were constitutionally infirm because failure to make good on a dishonored check within two days does not, by itself, sufficiently establish knowledge of insufficient funds or intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. The court nevertheless affirmed the defendant’s convictions for four counts of larceny by uttering a false check, concluding that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of knowledge and fraudulent intent.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether G. L. c. 266, § 37's designation of a defendant's failure to pay a dishonored check within two days of notice as prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds and intent to defraud violates due process.
- Whether the corresponding jury instruction, which permitted the jury to infer knowledge and fraudulent intent from the defendant's failure to make good on the checks within two days of notice, was constitutionally infirm.
- Whether the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the other evidence.
Holdings
- G. L. c. 266, § 37's designation of a defendant's failure to make good on a dishonored check within two days of notice as prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds and intent to defraud is constitutionally infirm because the basic fact, without more, lacks a sufficiently strong and logical connection to those essential elements of the offense to permit proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The jury instruction corresponding to § 37 was invalid because it suggested that proof of the defendant's failure to make good on a bad check within two days of notice was sufficient to infer knowledge of insufficient funds and intent to defraud, even though those elements had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, so reversal of the defendant's convictions was not warranted.
Key quotations
“We conclude that the statute's designation of prima facie evidence and the corresponding instruction are constitutionally infirm because a defendant's failure to pay a check within two days of being notified of its dishonor is, without more, insufficient to warrant a jury in finding the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (slip op. at 2)
“Because the designation of prima facie evidence in § 37 effectively dilutes the Commonwealth's burden of proof, it is constitutionally infirm and thus the instruction given by the judge was invalid.” (slip op. at 12)
“In light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's knowledge and intent, the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (slip op. at 17)
Factual background
The defendant deposited four checks totaling $15,000 into her TD Bank accounts through automated teller machines. Each check was drawn on a Citizens Bank account in the defendant's name that had been closed for years, and after the deposits the defendant transferred funds among her accounts and made substantial expenditures before the checks were returned unpaid. After TD Bank notified her that the checks had bounced, she did not repay the bank, ultimately leaving the accounts overdrawn by approximately $12,000.
Procedural history
A complaint was received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division of the District Court Department on January 21, 2014. After a jury trial before Judge Michael A. Uhlarik, the defendant was convicted on four counts of larceny by uttering a false check. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case to itself.