Commonwealth v. Lopes

478 Mass. 593 (2018) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · January 10, 2018 · No. SJC-11587

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Crisostomo Lopes's conviction of murder in the first degree. The court rejected challenges concerning the Commonwealth's peremptory strikes of prospective jurors, admission of gang-affiliation evidence, limits on cross-examination about prior misconduct, and the prosecutor's closing argument, and declined to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or set aside the verdict.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Kafker, J.; Gants, C.J.; Lenk, J.; Budd, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
January 10, 2018
Docket number
SJC-11587
Procedural posture
After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. He appealed, challenging jury selection, admission of gang evidence, limits on cross-examination, and the prosecutor's closing argument. The Supreme Judicial Court also conducted review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Standard of review
The court reviewed jury-selection rulings for abuse of discretion, admission of gang evidence for prejudicial error, evidentiary limits on cross-examination for abuse of discretion, and the prosecutor's closing argument in the context of the entire argument, admitted evidence, and jury instructions. The court independently reviewed the record under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for a basis to reduce or set aside the first-degree murder verdict or order a new trial.
Precedential value
Published Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion; precedential
Parties
Crisostomo Lopes v. Commonwealth
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

jury selectionevidencecharacter evidenceprosecutorial misconductappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedureevidenceconstitutional lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of prospective jurors were improperly based on race and whether the trial judge erred in failing to require explanations or in accepting the explanations provided.
  2. Whether evidence concerning the defendant's alleged gang affiliation and neighborhood gang activity was improperly admitted.
  3. Whether the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination of a police officer concerning a prior internal affairs investigation involving alleged lying.
  4. Whether the prosecutor's closing argument improperly characterized the codefendant's defense as an "insult," "farce," and "distraction," requiring reversal.
  5. Whether the verdict should be reduced or set aside, or a new trial ordered, under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

  1. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding no prohibited race-based pattern for the challenged jurors and in accepting the prosecutor's explanations for striking juror no. 104 as adequate and genuine. Youth and college-student status are not constitutionally protected groups for Batson-Soares purposes, and age may constitute a race-neutral basis for a peremptory challenge.
  2. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting limited evidence concerning the defendant's alleged gang affiliation and neighborhood gang activity because the evidence was relevant to motive and intent and explained the defendant's statements invoking "Homes Ave." The probative value was not outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly in light of limiting instructions.
  3. The trial judge acted within his discretion in excluding evidence that a police witness had been suspended five years earlier for, among other things, lying during an unrelated internal affairs investigation.
  4. The prosecutor's characterization of the codefendant's defense as an "insult," "farce," and "distraction" was overly aggressive but, in context, did not constitute reversible error. The judge's specific curative instruction eliminated any concern of prejudice.
  5. The court found no basis to reduce or set aside the first-degree murder verdict or order a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Key quotations

Peremptory challenges have not, however, been prohibited based on age, under either the United States or Massachusetts Constitution. (at 604)
Evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible to show motive. (at 613)
Even when understandably provoked, a prosecutor must not "fight fire with fire." (at 620)

Factual background

The fourteen-year-old victim was riding a motorized scooter in Dorchester when the defendant pulled him from the scooter and held him. The juvenile codefendant then shot the victim multiple times at close range, causing his death. Evidence included eyewitness testimony, recovery of the matching firearm, gunshot residue, the defendant's statements invoking "Homes Ave.," and testimony concerning neighborhood gang affiliations and disputes.

Procedural history

An indictment was returned in the Superior Court Department on July 1, 2010. Following a jury trial before Patrick F. Brady, J., Lopes was convicted of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected his claims of reversible error, declined to reduce or set aside the verdict under § 33E, and affirmed the conviction.

Court Document

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