Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Massachusetts statutes governing OUI-related blood testing prohibit a nonconsensual blood draw even when law enforcement obtains a search warrant. Because the defendant refused consent and the blood-alcohol evidence was central to the prosecution, its admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also vacated the convictions and remanded the case for retrial, addressing the voluntariness of statements made by the defendant after the accident.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Massachusetts General Laws chapter 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1), prohibits a nonconsensual blood draw for alcohol testing in an OUI-related prosecution even when police obtain a search warrant.
- Whether the trial judge erred by admitting the blood-alcohol evidence and, if so, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Whether the defendant's head injury and evidence of concussion made voluntariness of his statements a live issue requiring the judge to conduct a sua sponte voir dire and give a humane-practice instruction.
- Whether the failure to determine voluntariness and give the instruction created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice concerning the misleading-an-investigator conviction.
Holdings
- Massachusetts General Laws chapter 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1), unambiguously prohibits a blood or breath test for BAC after an arrestee refuses consent; the prohibition applies even when police obtain a search warrant.
- The erroneous admission of the BAC evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Because evidence of the defendant's head injury and concussion made voluntariness a live issue, the judge was required to make an independent determination of voluntariness and give a humane-practice instruction before the jury could consider the statements.
Key quotations
“The Commonwealth's suggested interpretation, endorsed by the dissent, ignores the plain statutory language that creates a blanket prohibition against blood draws without consent in the context of OUI prosecutions.” (486 Mass. at 431)
“Thus, the Appeals Court has made clear that, although it may be constitutional to obtain a blood sample from an unwilling participant with a warrant and probable cause, here in the Commonwealth an involuntary blood draw is statutorily prohibited if it is sought for the purposes of an OUI investigation.” (486 Mass. at 433)
“Given the relationship between the defendant's head injuries and his mental condition, the voluntariness of his statements was a live issue at trial.” (486 Mass. at 440)
Factual background
After Katrina McCarty's SUV crashed into a highway on-ramp guardrail and blocked much of the roadway, the defendant collided with the SUV and seriously injured McCarty, who was dragged beneath the defendant's vehicle. Troopers observed that the defendant was unsteady, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and smelled strongly of alcohol; he also had a head injury and signs of a concussion. The defendant refused consent to a blood draw, but officers obtained a warrant and physically restrained him while a nurse drew his blood, which showed a .135 percent alcohol content at the time of the draw and an estimated .16 to .26 percent at the time of the accident. At the scene, the defendant made statements suggesting that another vehicle had caused the accident and fled.
Procedural history
The complaint was sworn in the Westborough Division of the District Court Department and the case was later transferred to the Worcester Division. Following a jury trial before Judge Andrew M. D'Angelo, the defendant was convicted of OUI causing serious bodily injury, negligent operation, and misleading an investigator. The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review and vacated the convictions of OUI causing serious bodily injury and misleading an investigator, remanding for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
The convictions of OUI causing serious bodily injury and misleading an investigator are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the District Court for proceedings consistent with the opinion, including any retrial without the improperly admitted BAC evidence and with the required voluntariness determination and humane-practice instruction.