Summary
This Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion affirms a trial judge's decision to grant a new trial in a first-degree murder case due to the prosecution's failure to comply with a state statute requiring a preliminary determination that an interpreter can accurately communicate with a deaf, severely language-deprived witness. The court held that the statute creates an enforceable right for defendants to challenge improperly admitted testimony and found that the lack of a proper competency hearing created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, particularly given the witness's nonresponsive answers during cross-examination. The decision clarifies the scope of G.L. c. 221, § 92A and the remedies available when its requirements are not met.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether G. L. c. 221, § 92A, third paragraph, creates an enforceable evidentiary protection that permits a criminal defendant to challenge the admission of testimony through an interpreter when the defendant is not deaf or hearing impaired.
- Whether the substitute-interpreter remedy in G. L. c. 221, § 92A, fourth paragraph, applies when the required threshold determination under the third paragraph was never made.
- Whether the trial judge abused her discretion in granting a new trial where the required interpreter-competency determination was omitted, trial counsel did not object, and the omission created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Holdings
- Section 92A, third paragraph, establishes an evidentiary prerequisite to admitting testimony through an interpreter and protects persons with a substantial interest in the proceeding, including the criminal defendant; therefore, Lozada could challenge the admission of Samot's testimony based on the statutory violation.
- The fourth paragraph's substitute-interpreter remedy applies when an interpreter who was initially found competent later becomes unable to provide effective communication during the proceeding; it does not replace or cure the required threshold determination before testimony is admitted.
- The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in finding a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and granting a new trial because the statutory violation materially affected the presentation and cross-examination of the prosecution's critical identification witness.
Key quotations
“It sets forth an evidentiary rule that protects not only the deaf or hearing-impaired witness, but also those, like the defendant in the present action, who have a substantial interest in the outcome of the proceeding.” (at 9)
“Specifically, it provides that "no testimony shall be admitted as evidence" until this and the other two prerequisites are met.” (at 10)
“The fourth paragraph thus, rather than providing a remedy where the threshold determination has not been made, provides a remedy for a different situation, namely, where the threshold determination required under § 92A, third par., has been made and then it becomes apparent during the proceeding that the original interpreter is no longer able to function effectively.” (at 11)
“The proceeding required by § 92A would have informed the entire course of Samot's testimony.” (at 14)
“On the record before us, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's allowance of the defendant's amended motion for a new trial, and on that basis we affirm the order.” (at 16)
Factual background
Sammy Lozada was convicted based in significant part on testimony from Maria Samot, the prosecution's key identification witness to the stabbing death of Carlos Ramos. Samot was deaf, illiterate, severely language deprived, and communicated through idiosyncratic culturally based gestures rather than a recognized language, including American Sign Language. Her testimony was presented through two certified deaf interpreters and two ASL interpreters, but the trial judge made no preliminary determination under G. L. c. 221, § 92A, third par., that the interpreters could communicate accurately with Samot and translate information to and from her. During cross-examination, Samot repeatedly gave nonresponsive answers identifying Lozada as the killer, and posttrial experts testified that the interpreting process was not sufficiently accurate or suited to her communication needs.
Procedural history
Lozada was convicted in the Superior Court of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, two counts of home invasion, and malicious destruction of property. He sought a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b), arguing that testimony from the prosecution's deaf and severely language-deprived identification witness had been admitted without the interpreter-competency determination required by G. L. c. 221, § 92A, third par. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge allowed the amended motion, finding a statutory violation and a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; the Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.