Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Christopher R. Fletcher’s conviction of murder in the first degree and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that an erroneous instruction concerning the malice required for deliberately premeditated murder did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. It also rejected Fletcher’s claims of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s handling of expert testimony, other evidence, the motion to suppress, and trial proceedings, and declined relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial judge's erroneous instruction that either the first or second prong of malice could support a conviction for deliberately premeditated murder created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present expert testimony concerning Fletcher's mental state and ability to premeditate.
- Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence concerning Fletcher's alleged false confessions to other murders and an imagined conversation with police.
- Whether counsel was ineffective in litigating the motion to suppress and in allowing a State trooper to testify concerning information supplied by a witness.
- Whether prosecutorial comments and conduct warranted a new trial or other relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- Although the judge improperly instructed that either the first or second prong of malice could support deliberately premeditated murder, the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial.
- Trial counsel was not ineffective for declining to present expert testimony concerning Fletcher's insanity, intoxication, or capacity to premeditate.
- Counsel was not ineffective for declining to introduce evidence that Fletcher had confessed to other murders or had described an imagined conversation with police.
- Counsel was not ineffective in litigating the motion to suppress, and the motion judge correctly concluded that Fletcher was not under arrest when initially approached or, alternatively, that probable cause supported the arrest.
- The court found no basis to order a new trial or reduce the verdict under its section 33E authority.
Key quotations
“Where the judge makes clear that premeditated murder contains as a necessary condition of guilt a finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific intent to kill, an error in instructing the jury on the second prong of malice does not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.” (561-562)
“In view of the judge’s clear and forceful instructions that, to convict the defendant of premeditated murder, the jury “must find a conscious and a fixed purpose to kill continuing for a length of time,” there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice from the erroneous portions of the judge’s instruction.” (564)
Factual background
Fletcher, who was homeless and angry after being rejected by the victim, located her at a bar and later went to her home despite her refusal to let him stay with her. He concealed his presence by removing a light bulb, cutting a telephone line, and slashing automobile tires, then confronted the victim and fatally cut and stabbed her neck. After his arrest or detention by State police, he admitted killing the victim and described his activities. At trial, he admitted the killing but relied on insanity and intoxication defenses; counsel presented no expert mental-state testimony but obtained instructions on both defenses.
Procedural history
A jury convicted Fletcher of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Before trial, the court denied his motion to suppress statements and physical evidence after a three-day evidentiary hearing. The trial court later denied Fletcher's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed both the judgment and that order.