Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that factual statements in a workers’ compensation lump-sum settlement agreement were admissible against the plaintiff in her subsequent medical malpractice action against the examining physician and his employer. The court concluded that the plaintiff adopted the agreement’s contents by signing it, and that the statements were not excluded merely because they appeared in a settlement document. It also held that the workers’ compensation statute did not create an evidentiary privilege and affirmed judgment for the defendants.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's statements in a workers' compensation lump-sum settlement agreement were admissible as admissions by a party opponent when the agreement had been prepared by the insurer's counsel and signed by the plaintiff.
- Whether factual statements contained in a settlement agreement are excluded by the rule against admitting settlement offers and acceptances to prove liability.
- Whether G. L. c. 152, § 48 (5), bars admission of the contents of a workers' compensation lump-sum agreement in a separate action arising from a distinct injury.
- Whether the plaintiff preserved an objection to specific language in the redacted agreement.
Holdings
- A trial judge may admit statements in a document prepared by a third party when the opposing party signed the document and thereby adopted its contents as her own statements.
- The rule excluding settlement offers and acceptances to prove or disprove liability does not exclude factual admissions merely because they are appended to a settlement agreement, where they are not offered to show willingness to compromise.
- General Laws c. 152, § 48 (5), does not create an evidentiary privilege barring admission of the contents of a workers' compensation lump-sum agreement in a separate action.
- A generalized objection to use of an agreement does not preserve an appellate challenge to particular language in the redacted document when the specific objection was not presented to the trial judge.
Key quotations
“The written statements of a third person may be so dealt with by the party that his assent to the correctness of the statements may be inferred, and they would thus by adoption become his own statements.” (508)
“As with all Evidentiary admissions, it is always open to the party to give evidence that the pleading or other admissive declaration made by counsel was made or filed upon incorrect information. This will go to the weight of the admission evidence, and not to its admissibility.” (509)
“The statute is concerned with recoveries for various injuries. We have never suggested that § 48 (5) established an evidentiary privilege barring all reference to an agreement’s contents, and we see no indication that the Legislature, by using the single word “affect,” intended to create one.” (511)
Factual background
Catherine E. Zueco, a charge nurse, injured her foot at work and received workers' compensation benefits. During a workers' compensation claim, she underwent a medical examination by Dr. Richard Kane and later sued Kane and his employer, IME, Inc., alleging that the examination negligently caused reflex sympathetic dystrophy. The plaintiff had signed a workers' compensation lump-sum settlement agreement containing factual statements concerning the origin and condition of her injury that conflicted with portions of her trial testimony. The trial judge admitted a redacted version of the agreement for limited purposes, including impeachment, credibility, and as admissions by the plaintiff.
Procedural history
After a jury found that Dr. Kane was not negligent, judgment entered for Dr. Kane and IME, Inc. The Appeals Court reversed the judgment as to Dr. Kane based on the admission of the redacted settlement agreement but affirmed as to IME, Inc. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment for Dr. Kane and affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial; it found no remaining issue concerning IME's vicarious liability.