Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant was entitled to a new appeal because the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal from a suppression order had been decided without a defense brief or oral argument, effectively denying the defendant the assistance of counsel. The court then reached the merits and held that police had reasonable safety concerns justifying ordering the defendant out of a vehicle and conducting a pat frisk during a traffic stop. The suppression order was reversed and the matter was remanded.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether an appellate court may decide the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal from a suppression order when the represented defendant's counsel filed no brief and presented no oral argument.
- Whether the defendant was entitled to relief without showing that the absence of appellate counsel actually prejudiced the merits of his case.
- Whether the police officer had a reasonable belief that his safety was in danger sufficient to order the defendant out of the vehicle and conduct a patfrisk during a lawful traffic stop.
Holdings
- A defendant is entitled to be heard and to the effective assistance of counsel when the Commonwealth appeals an interlocutory suppression order, and the defendant is effectively denied counsel when appellate counsel files no brief and presents no argument.
- A defendant who has actually or constructively been denied counsel on appeal need not establish a colorable appellate issue or actual prejudice as a prerequisite to restoration of appellate rights.
- The officer was justified in ordering Goewey out of the vehicle and conducting a patfrisk because, under the totality of the circumstances, he could reasonably believe that his safety was in danger.
Key quotations
“In sum, in this case the hearing and decision of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal was devoid of any advocacy on behalf of the defendant. It was not, as it should have been, an adversary process.” (452 Mass. at 405)
“We conclude that, in the totality of circumstances, the officer could have reasonably believed that his safety was in danger.” (452 Mass. at 407)
“The fact that he was smoking a cigarette on the officer’s return to the vehicle did not necessarily render unreasonable the officer’s otherwise legitimate concerns about a weapon.” (452 Mass. at 408)
Factual background
During a February 27, 2004, traffic stop, State Trooper Brendan O'Neill observed that the vehicle lacked an inspection sticker and that none of its occupants was wearing a seat belt. Passenger Thomas Goewey produced an expired driver's license whose photograph appeared significantly dissimilar to him, acted nervously, and made movements that appeared to Sergeant George Hamilton to involve concealing or retrieving something. Hamilton ordered Goewey out of the vehicle and conducted a patfrisk; Goewey stated that he had marijuana, which was found concealed under his pant leg.
Procedural history
Goewey was charged in the District Court with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and a seat-belt violation. The District Court allowed his motion to suppress, finding no reasonable suspicion to support the patfrisk. The Commonwealth obtained leave to appeal under Mass. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(2). The Appeals Court reversed after the defendant's appointed counsel filed no brief and presented no oral argument. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review because the appeal had been decided without advocacy for the defendant, then addressed both the appellate-counsel issue and the merits of suppression.
Remand instructions
The order allowing the motion to suppress is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.