Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Stevie Walker’s motion to suppress statements made to police and affirmed his conviction of murder in the first degree under a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court held that Walker knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, that his statements were voluntary, and that his written waiver of the right to prompt arraignment was valid. The court also rejected his claim concerning the statutory right to make a telephone call and found no basis to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Walker knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
- Whether Walker's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
- Whether Walker's written waiver of the right to a prompt arraignment under Commonwealth v. Rosario was voluntary and whether the delay required suppression.
- Whether the police's delayed advisement of Walker's statutory right to make a telephone call required suppression of evidence.
- Whether the jury instructions adequately explained how mental impairment and voluntary drug consumption could bear on the Cunneen factors for murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
Holdings
- The Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
- Walker's statements were voluntary and were not the product of police conduct that overbore his will.
- The written waiver of Walker's right to a prompt arraignment was voluntary, and the statements were not subject to suppression under the Rosario rule.
- Although police violated G. L. c. 276, § 33A by failing to inform Walker promptly of his telephone-call right, suppression was not required because the violation was not intentional.
- The jury instructions, considered as a whole, adequately permitted consideration of mental impairment and voluntary drug consumption both in evaluating malice and in determining whether the killing was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty; the isolated use of 'and/or' was harmless.
Key quotations
“In reviewing a [decision] on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error ‘but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law.’” (270)
“Due process requires a separate inquiry into the voluntariness of [a defendant’s] statement, apart from the validity of the Miranda waiver.” (277)
“Only an intentional violation of the statute requires suppression of evidence.” (278)
Factual background
Police investigating a fatal stabbing focused on Walker after finding blood evidence and a dreadlock at the crime scene and receiving information that he had entered the building. Two days after the killing, Walker went to a police station, where officers administered Miranda warnings and later homicide detectives obtained written waivers and recorded an interview. Walker had used crack cocaine several days earlier, was tired and hungry during the interview, and had a hand injury, but officers and the motion judge found no impairment or coercive circumstances. At trial, the evidence included eyewitness identification and DNA evidence linking Walker to the victim and crime scene; the defense argued that mental impairment and cocaine use prevented the requisite criminal intent.
Procedural history
A jury convicted Walker of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Before trial, a motion judge denied Walker's motion to suppress statements, except for one question-and-answer exchange not at issue on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the suppression ruling and conviction and found no basis for extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.