Commonwealth v. Bonnett

472 Mass. 827 (2015) · Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · September 24, 2015 · No. SJC-11496

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed Darkens Bonnett's first-degree murder conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including challenges concerning trial strategy, witness testimony, identification, and a videotaped police interview. It remanded for further proceedings on the defendant's motion seeking disclosure of the identity of an FBI informant who reportedly implicated another individual in the shooting.

Court
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Writing for the Court
Lenk, J.; Gants, C.J.; Cordy, J.; Duffly, J.; Hines, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
September 24, 2015
Docket number
SJC-11496
Procedural posture
Defendant appealed from a first-degree murder conviction and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He also appealed the denial of a pretrial motion seeking disclosure of a confidential informant's identity.
Standard of review
The denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion, with special deference to a motion judge who also presided at trial. In a first-degree murder appeal, the court independently reviews the entire record under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E, applying the substantial-likelihood-of-a-miscarriage-of-justice standard. A preserved informant-disclosure claim is reviewed for harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt if error occurred.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Parties
Darkens Bonnett v. Commonwealth
Disposition
remanded

Topics

ineffective assistanceright to counselprivilegediscovery criminalappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional criminal procedureevidencepost-conviction reliefappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance through alleged errors involving opening statements, witness examination, identification, videotaped police interviews, firearm and drug evidence, and closing arguments.
  2. Whether the trial judge erred by denying the defendant's motion to disclose the identity of an informant whose reported information implicated Payne rather than Bonnett as the shooter.
  3. Whether the court should exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E, to reduce the first-degree murder verdict or order a new trial.

Holdings

  1. The defendant did not establish constitutionally ineffective assistance or a substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice occurred. The challenged strategic decisions and failures to object, considered individually and cumulatively, did not warrant a new trial.
  2. The fact that federal authorities, rather than the Commonwealth, possessed the informant's identity did not by itself defeat the defendant's request for disclosure. Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to information, the burden of securing federal cooperation rests on the Commonwealth rather than the defendant.
  3. A trial judge considering disclosure of a confidential informant's identity must conduct an orderly, two-stage inquiry: first, determine whether the privilege was properly asserted and whether the defendant adequately showed that it interferes with a fair defense; second, balance the public interest in protecting informants against the defendant's right to prepare a defense under Roviaro.
  4. The matter must be remanded for reconsideration of the defendant's pretrial motion under the required disclosure framework. If disclosure is warranted, the defendant must receive a reasonable opportunity to interview the informant and investigate; a new trial is appropriate only if the resulting evidence might create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.

Key quotations

the burden of securing Federal cooperation should be placed on the State prosecutor rather than on the defendant. (at 848)
The analysis of whether an informant's identity should be kept confidential or disclosed may best be described as generally occurring in two stages. (at 849)
There was no attempt by the judge at orderly appraisal of the actuality of any threat and the materiality of the [information] sought. (at 856)

Factual background

Vincent Gaskins was shot and killed in a Lynn parking lot after an argument involving the defendant's friend, Brandon Payne. A percipient witness identified Bonnett as the shooter at trial, and the Commonwealth introduced fingerprint, DNA, confession, and videotape evidence linking Bonnett to the crime. Shortly before trial, the defense received an FBI report stating that an informant had heard that Payne shot Gaskins and then gave the pistol to Bonnett to dispose of it.

Procedural history

A Superior Court jury convicted Bonnett of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The trial judge denied Bonnett's motion for a new trial after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the ineffective-assistance claim, but remanded for further proceedings concerning disclosure of the informant's identity.

Remand instructions

The Superior Court must hold a hearing to reconsider the defendant's pretrial motion for disclosure of the informant's identity under the dual-sovereignty and informant-privilege framework described in the opinion. If the motion is meritorious, the defendant must receive a reasonable interval to interview the informant and investigate pertinent information. A new trial may be ordered if the resulting evidence might create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist; otherwise the verdict and judgment may stand.

Court Document

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