Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the retroactive application of counsel's duty to advise noncitizen defendants about immigration consequences extends to guilty pleas entered after the effective date of AEDPA, April 24, 1996, and before the effective date of IIRIRA, April 1, 1997. The court vacated the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial and remanded for findings regarding deficient advice and whether the defendant would have rejected the plea.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Massachusetts retroactivity rule requiring effective advice to noncitizen defendants concerning the immigration consequences of a guilty plea applies to a conviction entered after AEDPA's effective date but before IIRIRA's effective date.
- Whether the motion judge properly denied Mercado's motion for a new trial without making findings resolving the conflicting testimony concerning counsel's advice, language assistance, and the potential suppression defense.
Holdings
- The retroactivity of the Padilla-based duty under Massachusetts law extends to convictions entered on or after April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA, including convictions entered before April 1, 1997, the effective date of IIRIRA, when AEDPA had eliminated previously available protections or discretionary waivers for the relevant controlled-substance offense.
- The denial of Mercado's motion for a new trial must be vacated and the matter remanded because the motion judge made no findings after an evidentiary hearing involving material credibility disputes.
Key quotations
“To prove the latter proposition, the defendant bears the substantial burden of showing that (1) he had an available, substantial ground of defence . . . that would have been pursued if he had been correctly advised of the dire immigration consequences attendant to accepting the plea bargain; (2) there is a reasonable probability that a different plea bargain (absent such consequences) could have been negotiated at the time; or (3) the presence of special circumstances that support the conclusion that he placed, or would have placed, particular emphasis on immigration consequences in deciding whether to plead guilty”
Factual background
Mercado, a noncitizen from the Dominican Republic who primarily spoke Spanish, pleaded guilty on February 7, 1997, to possession of heroin, a class A substance. He later received notice that the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him based on that conviction and was ordered deported. At the motion hearing, Mercado and his former attorney gave conflicting testimony about whether counsel advised him regarding immigration consequences, whether an interpreter was used, and whether he consented to the search that produced the heroin.
Procedural history
Mercado pleaded guilty in the Boston Municipal Court to possession of a class A controlled substance and received a suspended sentence. After receiving a notice to appear in removal proceedings, he filed a motion for a new trial in 2015. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Mercado and plea counsel gave conflicting testimony, the motion judge denied the motion without making findings. The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review, clarified the applicable retroactivity period, vacated the denial, and remanded for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
The motion judge must conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including making findings based on the existing evidentiary record or holding a further evidentiary hearing. The judge must resolve the credibility disputes and determine whether counsel's performance was deficient and whether Mercado was prejudiced.