Summary
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed as moot William J. Papp III's appeal from the denial of his petition for extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Papp challenged a mistrial and proposed retrial on double jeopardy grounds, but his retrial had already occurred; the court held that he could pursue the double jeopardy claim in his pending direct appeal.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Papp's appeal from the denial of extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was moot after the challenged retrial had already occurred.
- Whether Papp's underlying double jeopardy claim remained available for review in his direct appeal from the convictions.
Holdings
- The appeal was moot because the retrial had already taken place, making it too late for the requested extraordinary relief to prevent the retrial or provide the pretrial review contemplated by Neverson v. Commonwealth.
- The underlying double jeopardy claim was not moot; Papp remained free to pursue it in the Appeals Court through his direct appeal, which could provide relief from his convictions if warranted.
Key quotations
“This appeal from the denial of extraordinary relief is therefore moot and will be dismissed.”
“To be clear, Papp's double jeopardy claim itself is not moot; he remains free to pursue that claim in the Appeals Court, which can, if warranted, provide relief from his convictions.”
Factual background
Papp's first jury trial was interrupted shortly after the prosecutor began questioning a Commonwealth witness because the prosecutor experienced a medical problem requiring immediate hospital treatment. The District Court judge declared a mistrial, finding manifest necessity and ruling that retrial was permissible. Papp was retried and convicted as charged before the full court reviewed his appeal from the denial of extraordinary relief.
Procedural history
Papp was charged in the District Court with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense, and operating with a suspended license. During the first jury trial, the prosecutor suffered a medical emergency, and the trial judge declared a mistrial after finding manifest necessity and ruling that retrial was permissible. Papp sought extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, but the single justice denied relief. Papp was then retried and convicted, filed a direct appeal pending in the Appeals Court, and separately appealed the denial of extraordinary relief. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the latter appeal as moot.