Summary
The Michigan Supreme Court held that Christopher Foster was a necessary party in Shae Kevin Graham’s action under the Revocation of Paternity Act because the requested relief would require termination of Christopher’s parental rights. The Court further held that Sharea Foster could not assert a statute-of-limitations defense personal to Christopher and that the defense could not be adjudicated before Christopher was joined as a party. The Court affirmed the necessary-party determination and vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision addressing Christopher’s anticipated limitations defense.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Christopher Foster was a necessary party because the relief sought would require termination of his parental rights.
- Whether Sharea Foster could assert a statute-of-limitations defense based on Graham's failure to join Christopher before the limitations period expired.
- Whether the Court of Appeals could adjudicate the merits of Christopher's anticipated statute-of-limitations defense before Christopher was joined as a party.
Holdings
- A person whose parental rights must be terminated to provide the plaintiff with the requested relief is a necessary party who must be joined before disposition. Christopher was therefore a necessary party because Graham could not be named BF's legal father without terminating Christopher's parental rights.
- A statute-of-limitations defense is personal to the party who may benefit from it. Foster could not assert a limitations defense that was potentially available only to Christopher, because Foster was timely made a party.
- A court may not preemptively adjudicate the availability of a statute-of-limitations defense before the person entitled to assert it has been joined as a party.
Key quotations
“a statute of limitations defense is personal to the party raising it.” (4)
“The ability of a nonparty to raise a particular defense should not be preemptively adjudicated in the nonparty's absence.” (5)
Factual background
Sharea Foster was married to Christopher Foster when she gave birth to BF in 2009, making Christopher BF's presumptive legal father under Michigan law. Shae Graham alleged that he was BF's biological father and filed an action under the Revocation of Paternity Act within the statute's alternative one-year limitations period. Graham sought an order determining that BF was born out of wedlock, establishing Graham as the biological father, and naming him BF's legal father—relief that would require termination of Christopher's parental rights.
Procedural history
Graham filed an RPA complaint seeking determinations that the child was born out of wedlock, that Graham was the biological father, and that Graham should be established as the legal father. Foster moved for summary disposition, arguing that Christopher Foster, the child's presumptive legal father and a necessary party, had not been joined before the limitations period expired. The trial court held Christopher was not a necessary party and denied the motion. The Court of Appeals held Christopher was a necessary party but affirmed denial of summary disposition based on a purported necessary-party exception to the limitations and joinder rules, remanding for Christopher's addition. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the necessary-party determination but vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals decision adjudicating Christopher's anticipated statute-of-limitations defense.
Remand instructions
The Court of Appeals' determination that Christopher is a necessary party and its remand for further proceedings consistent with that determination remain undisturbed. If Graham files an amended complaint naming Christopher as a defendant, Christopher may assert a statute-of-limitations defense, and Graham may litigate whether any exception excuses the tardy joinder.