People v. Lively, 470 Mich. 248

680 N.W.2d 878 (2004) · Supreme Court of Michigan · June 16, 2004 · No. 123145

Summary

The Supreme Court of Michigan held that materiality is not an element of statutory perjury under MCL 750.422 and MCL 750.423 because the statutory text does not require that a false statement concern a material matter. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Tiffany Free Lively's perjury conviction. The opinion also concluded that materiality, if it were an element, would have to be submitted to the jury under United States v. Gaudin.

Court
Supreme Court of Michigan
Writing for the Court
Maura D. Corrigan, C.J.; Elizabeth A. Weaver, J.; Clifford W. Taylor, J.; Robert P. Young, Jr., J.; Stephen J. Markman, J.; Michael F. Cavanagh, J.; Marilyn J. Kelly, J.
Jurisdiction
Michigan
Decision date
June 16, 2004
Docket number
123145
Procedural posture
The prosecution appealed by leave from a Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant's perjury conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to determine whether materiality is an element of statutory perjury under MCL 750.422 and MCL 750.423.
Standard of review
De novo review of the legal question whether materiality is an element of the statutory offense of perjury.
Precedential value
Published Michigan Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
People of the State of Michigan v. Tiffany Free Lively
Disposition
reversed

Topics

statutory interpretationplain meaning rulelegislative intentcriminal procedureevidence

Practice areas

Criminal lawStatutory interpretationEvidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether materiality of the allegedly false statement is an element of perjury under MCL 750.422 and MCL 750.423.
  2. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to submit materiality to the jury.

Holdings

  1. Materiality is not an element of Michigan's statutory offense of perjury because MCL 750.423 defines perjury as willfully swearing falsely regarding any matter or thing for which an oath is authorized or required and does not require that the matter be material.
  2. Because materiality is not an element of Michigan's statutory perjury offense, the trial court did not err by refusing to submit materiality to the jury.

Key quotations

Our Legislature has thus defined perjury as a willfully false statement regarding any matter or thing, if an oath is authorized or required. Noticeably absent from this definition is any reference to materiality. (470 Mich. at 253)
The plain language of our perjury statute alters the common law and does not require proof of materiality. (470 Mich. at 256)

Factual background

Defendant's husband obtained a default judgment of divorce, and defendant moved to set it aside. At the hearing, she testified and submitted an affidavit stating that she had not known about the divorce proceeding and had not been served with the divorce complaint. The trial court set aside the default judgment, but the prosecution charged defendant with perjury based on those statements; she was convicted after the court refused to submit materiality to the jury.

Procedural history

After defendant's perjury trial, the jury found her guilty. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that materiality was an element of perjury that had to be submitted to the jury and that the instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction.

Remand instructions

The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals was reversed, and defendant's perjury conviction was reinstated.

Court Document

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