State v. Stevenson

656 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2003) · Supreme Court of Minnesota · February 6, 2003 · No. C8-01-505

Summary

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Kerry Dean Stevenson's convictions for indecent exposure and attempted fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court interpreted the statutory phrase "in the presence of a minor" to mean conduct reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor, and held that the evidence supported the attempt conviction. The court also concluded that the location and circumstances of Stevenson's conduct supported an inference of intent to be indecent.

Court
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Writing for the Court
Hanson, Justice
Jurisdiction
Minnesota
Decision date
February 6, 2003
Docket number
C8-01-505
Procedural posture
After a paper trial in district court, Stevenson was convicted of indecent exposure and attempted fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court of appeals affirmed both convictions. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted both parties' petitions for review and affirmed.
Standard of review
Statutory construction is reviewed de novo. On a criminal sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, the court determines whether the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision and assuming that conflicting testimony was disbelieved.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota; decided en banc.
Parties
Kerry Dean Stevenson v. State of Minnesota
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

statutory interpretationrule of lenitycriminal procedureevidence

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedurestatutory interpretationsex offensesevidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the phrase "in the presence of a minor" in Minnesota's fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct statute means that the conduct must actually be viewed by a minor, must occur in proximity to a minor, or must be reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor.
  2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Stevenson's conviction for attempted fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
  3. Whether the evidence supported the inference that Stevenson acted with the deliberate intent to be indecent required for an indecent-exposure conviction.

Holdings

  1. The statutory presence requirement means that the sexual conduct must be reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor. It does not require that a minor actually view the conduct.
  2. The evidence was sufficient to support the attempted fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction because Stevenson intentionally selected and used a location where his conduct was reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor, constituting a substantial step beyond preparation.
  3. The evidence supported an inference that Stevenson acted with the deliberate intent to be indecent because he masturbated in a location where his conduct was so likely to be observed that it was reasonable to presume that he intended it to be witnessed.

Key quotations

Because it is narrower than proximity, we interpret "in the presence of a minor" to mean "reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor." (239)
Our concept of "public" was not based on the privacy expectations of the defendant but on the likelihood that the conduct would be witnessed by others. (241)

Factual background

Stevenson masturbated in the driver's seat of a pickup truck parked in a handicapped space directly in front of a playground at Moore Lake Beach. The truck was approximately 10 to 15 feet from the playground, where 10 to 15 children were playing, and its untinted windshield and driver's-side window were approximately 3.5 feet above the ground. A passerby observed Stevenson, notified a lifeguard, and police arrested him.

Procedural history

Stevenson waived a jury trial and agreed to a paper trial. The district court found him guilty of indecent exposure, not guilty of completed fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, and guilty of the uncharged lesser-included offense of attempted fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court of appeals affirmed. Stevenson sought review of the sufficiency of the evidence, and the State sought review of the interpretation of the statutory presence requirement.

Court Document

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