State of Missouri v. Denford Jackson

Summary

The Missouri Supreme Court held that a trial court may not refuse a defendant’s requested lesser-included-offense instruction solely because the court believes a reasonable jury must accept particular evidence or draw particular inferences. Because the jury could disbelieve evidence supporting the differential element between first- and second-degree robbery, the court erred by refusing the second-degree robbery instruction. The convictions were vacated and the case was remanded.

Holdings

1. When a defendant timely requests an instruction on a nested lesser included offense consisting of a subset of the elements of the charged offense, the trial court must give the instruction when the differential element is one on which the State bears the burden of proof. The jury's ability to disbelieve all or part of the evidence, or to refuse to draw a necessary inference, itself supplies a basis in the evidence for acquitting on the greater offense and convicting on the nested lesser offense.
2. The trial court erred by refusing to instruct on second-degree robbery based on its view that no reasonable juror could disbelieve the employee's testimony or reject the inference that she reasonably believed Jackson held a gun.
3. The armed criminal action conviction also had to be vacated because the jury's armed criminal action verdict was predicated on its finding that Jackson committed first-degree robbery.
4. The Court did not reach Jackson's claims concerning the sufficiency of the transcript because vacatur and remand were required on the lesser included offense issue.

Questions Presented

1. Whether section 556.046 required the trial court to give Jackson's requested instruction on second-degree robbery, a nested lesser included offense of first-degree robbery, when the differential element was one on which the State bore the burden of proof.
2. Whether a trial court may refuse a requested nested lesser included offense instruction based solely on its conclusion that no reasonable juror could disbelieve the State's evidence or refuse to draw an inference establishing the differential element.
3. Whether the judgment of armed criminal action also had to be vacated because that conviction was predicated on the first-degree robbery conviction.

Disposition

vacated