Summary
The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed Pacer Ferguson's conviction for attempted robbery and addressed issues involving witness testimony, evidence of other crimes, prosecutorial misconduct, directed verdicts, sentencing, entry of judgment, and cumulative error. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. In the portion provided, the court held that alleged coercion of a witness affected credibility for the jury to assess rather than the witness's competency to testify.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the District Court abused its discretion by allowing Erin Spaeny to testify despite alleged coercion by law enforcement.
- Whether the admission of testimony concerning other crimes, wrongs, or acts was preserved for appellate review and was permissible under Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid.
- Whether the prosecutor's statement concerning Taylor's pretrial statements constituted prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct requiring a mistrial.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to deny Ferguson's motions for a directed verdict of acquittal.
- Whether Ferguson was sentenced on materially false information or otherwise denied due process at sentencing.
- Whether the District Court improperly sentenced Ferguson as though the offense were a crime of violence.
- Whether the District Court's failure to enter a written judgment within the statutory time period required dismissal.
- Whether cumulative error required a new trial.
Holdings
- Evidence that a witness was threatened or induced to testify in a particular manner generally bears on the witness's credibility and weight of testimony, not the witness's competency or admissibility of the testimony. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion by allowing Spaeny to testify.
- Ferguson's generalized pretrial objection and nonspecific trial objections did not preserve his Rule 404(b) challenges to particular testimony, so the Supreme Court declined to review the merits of those evidentiary arguments.
- The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on the prosecutor's statement that Taylor's pretrial statements were substantially different from his trial testimony.
- The District Court properly denied Ferguson's motions for a directed verdict because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of attempted robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The District Court erred by sentencing Ferguson as though he had committed a crime of violence merely because another member of the group used a knife. The court was required to find that Ferguson himself used or possessed and threatened to use a deadly weapon.
- The District Court's failure to enter the written judgment within the thirty-day period in § 46-18-116(1), MCA, did not deprive it of jurisdiction or require dismissal of the criminal case.
Key quotations
“"Traditionally, the testimony of a coerced witness has been admitted on the ground that the coercion goes to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not to its exclusion."” (126 P.3d 471)
“After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” (126 P.3d 484)
“This determination—the mere finding that someone in the group used a knife during the incident—does not rise to the level of a finding that Ferguson used the knife.” (126 P.3d 488)
Factual background
Ferguson was with several companions at a Billings Wal-Mart when they observed Don Janich carrying approximately $300 in cash. Ferguson, Taylor, and Vezina approached Janich's truck; one member of the group opened the door and pulled Janich, another demanded money, and one displayed a knife. Ferguson denied knowing about the planned robbery, but the jury convicted him of attempted robbery based on surveillance footage and testimony concerning the group's conduct and discussions.
Procedural history
The State charged Ferguson with attempted robbery. A jury convicted him, and the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction-related rulings, reversed the sentence insofar as the District Court treated the offense as a violent offense, and remanded for resentencing.
Remand instructions
Remand for resentencing consistent with Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-225, treating Ferguson as a nonviolent felony offender rather than sentencing him as though he committed a crime of violence.