Summary
The Nebraska Supreme Court considers whether the period during which the State pursued an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress should be excluded from the statutory speedy trial calculation. The court holds that because the appeal was statutorily authorized, it was an expected and reasonable consequence of the suppression motion, and the appeal period was excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a). The court affirms the denial of Edward Hood’s motion for absolute discharge.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the time attributable to the State's interlocutory appeal from an order granting Hood's motion to suppress was excludable from the statutory speedy trial calculation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a).
- Whether the excludability of the appeal period depended on the State's success in the appeal or the reason the appeal was dismissed.
Holdings
- When the State is statutorily authorized to take an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a defendant's pretrial motion, the time attributable to that appeal is excluded from the speedy trial calculation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a).
- The fact that the State's authorized appeal was dismissed for failure to timely file the bill of exceptions did not make the appeal period chargeable against Hood for speedy trial purposes.
Key quotations
“Under our analysis in Recek, the answer to that question does not turn on whether the State’s appeal was successful or why it was dismissed, but, rather, on whether it was authorized.” (753-754)
“As such, the State’s appeal was “an expected and reasonable consequence” of Hood’s motion to suppress, and “final disposition” of the motion to suppress under § 29-1207(4)(a) did not occur until the State’s appeal was decided.” (754)
Factual background
Hood was charged after a December 7, 2013, accident in which the driver of another vehicle was killed by a vehicle driven by Hood. Before trial, Hood moved to suppress blood and urine samples, and the district court granted the motion on February 27, 2015. The State timely initiated an appeal from the suppression order under its statutory authority, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because the bill of exceptions was not timely filed. Hood then sought absolute discharge, contending that the period during which the State's appeal was pending should not be excluded from the statutory speedy trial calculation.
Procedural history
Hood was charged in the district court with six offenses arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident. The district court granted Hood's motion to suppress blood and urine evidence, and the State pursued an interlocutory appeal under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-824. The Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed that appeal because the bill of exceptions was not timely filed. After remand, Hood moved for absolute discharge, arguing that the appeal period should count toward the six-month speedy trial period. The district court denied the motion, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Remand instructions
The cause was remanded for further proceedings after affirming the denial of Hood's motion for absolute discharge.