Summary
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Daniel J. Lovvorn’s motion for discharge based on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. The court held that certain continuances created excludable time under Nebraska’s speedy trial statute and that Lovvorn waived his statutory speedy trial right by filing the discharge motion when it delayed trial beyond the statutory period. Applying the Barker v. Wingo factors, the court also concluded that Lovvorn’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Lovvorn was entitled to discharge because the State violated Nebraska's statutory speedy trial requirement.
- Whether Lovvorn's constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution was violated.
Holdings
- A period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the defendant's request or with the defendant's consent is excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b), even when the continuance postpones only a pretrial hearing and leaves the previously scheduled trial date unchanged.
- The statutory speedy trial deadline is calculated by excluding the date the information is filed, counting forward six months, backing up one day, and adding properly excludable time. For a continuance, the excluded period begins the day after the continuance is granted and includes the day on which the continuance ends.
- A defendant's motion to discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds waives the statutory speedy trial right when the motion causes a timely trial to be continued beyond the statutory six-month period, discharge is denied, and the denial is affirmed on appeal.
- Lovvorn's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated under the Barker v. Wingo four-factor balancing test.
Key quotations
“The statutory language provides for excludable time whenever there is a “period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his or her counsel.”” (851)
“Lovvorn’s motion for discharge resulted in the continuance of the trial previously scheduled for September 11, 2018.” (852)
“Determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated requires application of a balancing test first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).” (853)
Factual background
The State filed an information against Lovvorn on January 19, 2018, charging him with numerous offenses, and trial was initially set for June 14, 2018. Lovvorn obtained a continuance of the pretrial hearing, and the State later obtained two trial continuances because material witnesses were unavailable. Lovvorn moved for discharge on September 6, 2018, before the adjusted statutory speedy trial deadline, and the district court denied the motion.
Procedural history
The State filed an information charging Lovvorn with multiple offenses on January 19, 2018. After continuances requested by Lovvorn and the State, Lovvorn moved for discharge on September 6, 2018. The district court denied the motion, finding that the statutory speedy trial period had not expired and that the constitutional speedy trial right had not been violated. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.