Summary
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Samantha R. Blocher’s motion for absolute discharge on speedy-trial grounds. The court held that the period during which Blocher was absent from a scheduled docket call and incarcerated in another county was properly excluded from the speedy-trial calculation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4).
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Blocher was absent or unavailable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(d) when she failed to appear for a Lancaster County docket call while incarcerated in Douglas County.
- Whether the period during which Blocher was incarcerated in Douglas County for a separate criminal matter was attributable to her or otherwise excludable from Nebraska's statutory speedy-trial calculation.
- Whether the Lancaster County authorities acted with sufficient diligence to secure Blocher's presence and whether the district court properly denied her motion for absolute discharge.
Holdings
- Blocher was absent or unavailable for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(d) when she failed to appear at the Lancaster County docket call, and her arrest and confinement in Douglas County did not relieve her of the responsibility to appear.
- Lancaster County acted with sufficient diligence to secure Blocher's presence, so the period during which she remained in Douglas County was not chargeable to the State.
- The speedy-trial deadline is calculated by excluding the day the information was filed, counting forward six months, backing up one day, and adding periods excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4).
- At least part of the period Blocher spent incarcerated in Douglas County was also properly excluded as delay resulting from other proceedings concerning her, including proceedings on other pending charges.
- Blocher was not entitled to absolute discharge because the period from her failure to appear on April 17, 2019, through the September 9 trial date was properly excluded, and the trial date was within six months of her reappearance and presumed reasonable.
Key quotations
“If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial as provided for in § 29-1207, as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any other offense required by law to be joined with that offense.” (877)
“To calculate the deadline for trial under the speedy trial statutes, a court must exclude the day the State filed the information, count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under § 29-1207(4).” (878)
“We conclude that on these facts, Lancaster County acted with sufficient diligence to secure Blocher’s presence.” (880)
Factual background
Blocher was charged in Lancaster County on February 7, 2019, with possession of methamphetamine and was ordered to appear for a pretrial docket call on April 17. She was arrested in Douglas County for shoplifting the day before the docket call, failed to appear in Lancaster County, and became subject to a bench warrant that was issued and served while she remained in Douglas County custody. After she was convicted and completed her Douglas County sentence, Lancaster County authorities immediately took custody of her and returned her to Lancaster County. Blocher sought absolute discharge, arguing that her Douglas County incarceration was improperly excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.
Procedural history
Blocher was charged by information with possession of methamphetamine. While awaiting proceedings in Lancaster County, she was arrested, convicted, and incarcerated in Douglas County on a shoplifting charge. Lancaster County issued and served a bench warrant, but Blocher remained in Douglas County until completing her sentence. After her return, she moved for absolute discharge, arguing that the time spent in Douglas County should count toward Nebraska's speedy-trial deadline. The district court denied the motion, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.