Summary
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Joshua J. Brown’s motion for absolute discharge based on alleged statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations. The court held that COVID-19-related continuances were properly excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) because the record supported specific findings of good cause. It also concluded that the delay did not violate Brown’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that the COVID-19-related sua sponte continuances were supported by good cause and therefore excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f).
- Whether the delays violated Brown's statutory right to a speedy trial under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208.
- Whether the delays violated Brown's federal and Nebraska constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
Holdings
- A period of delay caused by a trial court's sua sponte continuance may be excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) when the record, including evidence presented at a later discharge hearing, establishes good cause that objectively existed when the delay occurred.
- Brown was not entitled to absolute discharge because the statutory speedy trial period had not expired after excluding 26 days attributable to Brown's motions and 100 days attributable to good-cause pandemic continuances.
- The delays did not violate Brown's constitutional speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment or article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution.
Key quotations
“The only timing requirement implicit in § 29-1207(4)(f) is that the substantial reason affording a legal excuse objectively existed at the time of the delay.” (235)
“When a trial court relies on § 29-1207(4)(f) to exclude time from the speedy trial calculation, we have said that a general finding of “good cause” will not suffice.” (236)
“None of these four factors standing alone is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to speedy trial.” (241)
Factual background
The State filed an information charging Brown with first degree assault on October 31, 2019. The trial court granted a continuance requested by the State and later ordered two sua sponte continuances in March and May 2020 because the COVID-19 pandemic created public health, facility, screening, distancing, and jury-trial safety concerns. Brown objected to the continuances and moved for absolute discharge on July 31, 2020, arguing that the delays violated his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights.
Procedural history
The State charged Brown with first degree assault. After the trial court granted continuances requested by the State and later ordered sua sponte continuances because of COVID-19 public health conditions, Brown moved for absolute discharge. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that pandemic-related delays were excludable for good cause under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f), rejected both the statutory and constitutional speedy trial claims, and overruled the motion. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.