State v. Brooks

319 Neb. 377 · Nebraska Supreme Court · July 3, 2025 · No. S-24-721

Summary

This Nebraska Supreme Court opinion addresses whether a defendant's request for additional time to take depositions of witnesses named in a notice under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414 constitutes an excludable period of delay under the state's statutory speedy trial law. The court held that the requested delay constituted a "period of delay" for which the trial court properly found "good cause" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f). Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for absolute discharge based on statutory speedy trial grounds.

Court
Nebraska Supreme Court
Writing for the Court
Funke, C.J.; Miller-Lerman, J.; Cassel, J.; Stacy, J.; Papik, J.; Freudenberg, J.
Jurisdiction
Nebraska
Decision date
July 3, 2025
Docket number
S-24-721
Procedural posture
Appeal from the District Court for Furnas County
Standard of review
Factual determinations reviewed for clear error; questions of law reviewed de novo
Precedential value
published
Parties
Paul Douglas Brooks v. State of Nebraska
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

speedy trialappellate procedurestandard of reviewstatutory interpretation

Practice areas

criminal procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the period of delay for taking depositions constitutes a continuance under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(b) and is therefore excludable.
  2. Whether "good cause" existed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(f) to exclude the delay period from the speedy‑trial calculation.

Holdings

  1. The court held that the request for depositions was a continuance within the meaning of § 29‑1207(4)(b) and therefore the time was excludable.
  2. The court held that good cause existed because Brooks’ request to postpone the hearing until mid‑July was a substantial reason that afforded a legal excuse, so the delay was excludable.

Key quotations

Good cause, for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016), means a substantial reason and one that affords a legal excuse. (at 378)
We determine that the time from May 23, 2024, through “mid‑July” was for good cause under § 29‑1207(4)(f) such that the time should be excluded for calculating the statutory speedy trial period. (at 389)

Factual background

On Jan. 11, 2024 the State filed an information charging Brooks with two counts of first‑degree sexual assault and one count of third‑degree sexual assault of a child. Brooks filed a plea in abatement on Jan. 13, which the district court overruled on March 5. After a status hearing on May 23, 2024, Brooks requested that the court postpone the hearing on the State’s § 27‑414 notice until mid‑July so he could complete depositions of witnesses; the court granted the request and later excluded the resulting delay as "good cause" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(f).

Procedural history

Brooks was charged with three counts of sexual assault. He filed a plea in abatement which the district court overruled. The court set a status hearing, during which Brooks requested time to take depositions under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414. The district court excluded the deposition period as "good cause" under the speedy‑trial statute and denied Brooks' motion for absolute discharge. Brooks appealed the denial.

Court Document

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