State v. Amaya

298 Neb. 70 (2017) · Supreme Court of Nebraska · October 20, 2017 · No. No. S-16-959

Summary

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Jay D. Amaya’s successive motion for postconviction relief as time barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4). The court held that the statutory limitations period applies to successive motions, may be considered sua sponte during preliminary review, does not constitute ex post facto punishment, and was not tolled by alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. The court also upheld denial of Amaya’s motions to amend and to alter or amend the judgment.

Court
Supreme Court of Nebraska
Writing for the Court
Stacy, J.; Heavican, C.J.; Wright, J.; Miller-Lerman, J.; Cassel, J.; Kelch, J.; Funke, J.
Jurisdiction
Nebraska
Decision date
October 20, 2017
Docket number
No. S-16-959
Procedural posture
Amaya appealed from the Lincoln County District Court's denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his successive verified motion for postconviction relief and the denial of related motions to amend and to alter or amend the judgment.
Standard of review
The court reviewed de novo whether Amaya alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a constitutional violation or whether the files and records affirmatively showed that he was entitled to no relief. The district court's factual findings were reviewed for clear error. Denial of a motion to alter or amend the judgment was reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Precedential value
Published Nebraska Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Jay D. Amaya v. State of Nebraska
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

state post-conviction reliefsuccessive petitionspost-conviction reliefstatutory interpretationex post facto

Practice areas

criminal postconviction practicecriminal procedureappellate procedureconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the successive postconviction motion was barred by Nebraska's one-year statute of limitations.
  2. Whether a Nebraska trial court may sua sponte consider and rule on the timeliness of a postconviction motion during preliminary review when the motion and record affirmatively show that it is time barred.
  3. Whether application of the one-year postconviction limitations period to Amaya's pre-enactment offenses violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses.
  4. Whether Amaya established an impediment created by state action sufficient to toll the limitations period under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4)(c).
  5. Whether the district court erred by denying leave to amend the postconviction motion after dismissal and by denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment as untimely.

Holdings

  1. Nebraska's one-year statute of limitations for verified postconviction motions applies to all such motions, including successive motions.
  2. If preliminary review of the motion, files, and records affirmatively shows that a postconviction motion is time barred under § 29-3001(4), the trial court is permitted, but not required, to sua sponte consider and rule on timeliness.
  3. Applying the one-year postconviction limitations period to Amaya did not constitute ex post facto punishment.
  4. Amaya did not establish an impediment created by state action under § 29-3001(4)(c), and alleged ineffective assistance by prior postconviction counsel did not toll the one-year limitations period.
  5. Nebraska postconviction proceedings are not governed by the Nebraska Court Rules of Pleading in Civil Cases, and the postconviction statutes do not provide an opportunity to amend after the court has determined that the motion does not necessitate an evidentiary hearing.
  6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Amaya's motion to alter or amend because it was filed 19 days after judgment, beyond the 10-day period required by § 25-1329.

Key quotations

We now hold that if, as part of its preliminary review, the trial court finds the postconviction motion affirmatively shows— either on its face or in combination with the files and records before the court—that it is time barred under § 29-3001(4), the court is permitted, but not obliged, to sua sponte consider and rule upon the timeliness of the motion. (at 77)
To satisfy the tolling provision of § 29-3001(4)(c), a prisoner must show there was (1) an impediment created by state action, (2) which amounted to a violation of the federal or state Constitution or a state law, and (3) as a result, the prisoner was prevented from filing a verified motion. (at 79)

Factual background

In 1999, Amaya pleaded no contest to first degree murder, use of a knife in the commission of a felony, and sexual assault arising from the assault and murder of Sheri Fhuere. He filed an initial postconviction motion in 2006 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; relief was denied after an evidentiary hearing, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in 2008. Amaya filed a successive postconviction motion in September 2016, alleging ineffective assistance by trial counsel and prior postconviction counsel and asserting that the statutory limitations period was tolled by state action. The district court dismissed the motion as time barred without an evidentiary hearing, denied leave to amend, and denied a later motion to alter or amend the judgment as untimely.

Procedural history

Amaya pleaded no contest in 1999 to first degree murder, use of a knife in the commission of a felony, and sexual assault. After his first postconviction motion was denied following an evidentiary hearing, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in 2008. In 2016, Amaya filed a successive postconviction motion, which the district court dismissed with prejudice as time barred and otherwise procedurally deficient. The district court also denied his motion to amend, motion to alter or amend the judgment, and motion for appointment of postconviction counsel. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.

Court Document

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