Summary
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Joseph A. Gill’s motion for absolute discharge based on alleged statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations. The court held that Gill permanently waived his statutory speedy-trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a definite continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. The court also concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review Gill’s statute-of-limitations challenge to the information.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Nebraska Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction to review the statute-of-limitations issue raised in Gill's motion to quash.
- Whether a defendant's requested definite continuance that extends the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period permanently waives the statutory speedy-trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b).
- Whether Gill was entitled to discharge under his constitutional speedy-trial right notwithstanding the statutory waiver.
Holdings
- A ruling on a motion to quash alleging that charges are outside the statute of limitations is not a final, appealable order affecting a substantial right, and an appellate court cannot use an appeal from a separate final order denying absolute discharge to review that issue.
- Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b), a defendant permanently waives the statutory right to a speedy trial when a continuance requested by the defendant or counsel extends the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period, regardless of whether the continuance is definite or indefinite.
- Permanent waiver of the statutory speedy-trial right does not waive the constitutional speedy-trial right, but Gill was not entitled to relief on his constitutional claim.
Key quotations
“A defendant is deemed to have waived his or her right to speedy trial when the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel extends the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period.” (at 862-863)
“The defendant waives the statutory 6-month period when he or she requests a continuance that extends the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period. Once the defendant does that, the statutory clock is gone.” (at 866)
Factual background
Gill was charged in November 2015 with offenses allegedly committed between 1996 and 2006. He moved to quash the information on statute-of-limitations grounds, and the district court partially sustained that motion. Gill later requested a continuance because he had not completed depositions; the resulting trial date of September 14, 2016, extended beyond the applicable statutory six-month speedy-trial period. The district court denied Gill's motion for absolute discharge, concluding that his requested continuance permanently waived his statutory speedy-trial right.
Procedural history
Gill was charged with seven counts of first degree sexual assault and two counts of incest. The district court partially granted an initial motion to quash, later granted continuances requested by Gill and the State, and denied Gill's motion for absolute discharge. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the interlocutory appeal was properly before it only as to the denial of absolute discharge, lacked jurisdiction over the statute-of-limitations issue, and affirmed.