Dewey v. State, 123 Nev. 483

169 P.3d 1149 (2007) · Supreme Court of Nevada · November 1, 2007 · No. No. 46854

Summary

The Supreme Court of Nevada held that a suspect’s assertion of the right to remain silent does not, by itself, invoke the Miranda right to counsel. The court further held that police may resume questioning after a suspect invokes the right to remain silent if they scrupulously honor that invocation and provide renewed Miranda warnings. The court affirmed Dewey’s conviction, concluding that her subsequent statements were voluntarily made and admissible.

Court
Supreme Court of Nevada
Writing for the Court
Parraguirre, J.; Hardesty, J.; Saitta, J.
Jurisdiction
Nevada
Decision date
November 1, 2007
Docket number
No. 46854
Procedural posture
Dewey appealed her judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, arguing that statements made during a second custodial interview should have been suppressed because they violated her Miranda, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment rights and were involuntary.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the district court's determination that Dewey did not invoke her right to counsel for substantial evidence and reviewed the admission and voluntariness of the statements under the applicable constitutional standards, including totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
Precedential value
Published Nevada Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Shelli Rose Dewey, a/k/a Shelli Rose Castle v. The State of Nevada
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

miranda rightsright to counselfifth amendmentcriminal proceduresuppression of evidence

Practice areas

Criminal procedureConstitutional lawEvidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Dewey's statement that she did not want to talk to anyone constituted an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of her Miranda right to counsel.
  2. Whether police violated Dewey's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by initiating a second interview after she had invoked that right.
  3. Whether Dewey's statements during the second interview were involuntary under the Due Process Clause.
  4. Whether Dewey's Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to the pre-charge custodial interrogation.

Holdings

  1. A suspect's indication that she does not want to talk to anyone, without a clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous request for an attorney, does not invoke the Miranda right to counsel.
  2. After a suspect invokes the right to remain silent, police may initiate a new interrogation if they scrupulously honor the prior exercise of that right and provide a new set of Miranda warnings before questioning resumes.
  3. Dewey's statements were voluntary because, under the totality of the circumstances, they were not the product of physical intimidation, psychological pressure, or an overborne will.
  4. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not at issue because the interrogation occurred before adversarial judicial criminal proceedings had begun; Dewey's applicable right to counsel arose under Miranda's Fifth Amendment safeguards.

Key quotations

We conclude that unless a suspect's assertion of the right to remain silent includes a clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous request for an attorney, it is not an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda; thus, a suspect's exercise of the right to remain silent under Miranda, without more, does not operate as a request for counsel. (1150)
We also conclude that the police may resume questioning a suspect who has invoked her right to remain silent only if they have "scrupulously honored" the suspect's prior exercise of her right to terminate questioning and issue a new set of Miranda warnings prior to reinitiating further interrogation. (1150)
Finally, we conclude that Dewey freely and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights before voluntarily making the inculpatory statements at issue, and the district court committed no error in admitting those statements into evidence at trial. (1155)

Factual background

Dewey reported that her husband had been stabbed and was taken to the police station for questioning. After receiving Miranda warnings, she indicated that she did not want to talk to anyone, and the first interview ended. Approximately two hours later, other officers initiated a second interview after providing new Miranda warnings and obtaining a signed waiver; Dewey then admitted striking her husband with a knife and identified where the knife might be located. The police found the knife in the truck, and Dewey later expressly invoked her right to counsel during a third interview.

Procedural history

After Dewey's first custodial interview ended when she indicated that she did not want to talk, police initiated a second interview approximately two hours later after providing new Miranda warnings and obtaining a signed waiver. Dewey made inculpatory statements, which led to discovery of the knife. The district court denied her motion to suppress, and a jury convicted her of second-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

Court Document

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