State v. Ayer

Summary

The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviews Daniel Ayer’s conviction for first-degree murder after the trial court denied his request to represent himself and proceeded with appointed counsel during the first two days of trial. The court holds that denial of the defendant’s properly invoked right of self-representation was a structural defect requiring reversal and a new trial. The opinion also addresses preservation of the mistrial issue and identifies additional appellate arguments concerning the defendant’s recorded statement, jury selection, judicial recusal, juror compensation, and ineffective assistance.

Holdings

1. A defendant preserves a constitutional challenge to the continuation of trial after a trial court's error when the trial court directly addresses the appropriate remedies and the defendant states his objections on the record; the defendant need not request a mistrial without prejudice or waive double-jeopardy protections to preserve the issue.
2. Once a defendant clearly and unequivocally, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives counsel and timely invokes the right of self-representation, that right must be scrupulously respected through all critical stages unless the defendant affirmatively rescinds the waiver. Forcing appointed counsel to conduct the first two days of trial over the defendant's objection created a structural error that could not be cured by voir dire or jury instructions and required reversal and a new trial.
3. When a defendant successfully appeals a conviction on constitutional grounds, double jeopardy does not bar a new trial.
4. Under State v. Barnett, an incomplete recording of a post-Miranda interrogation may not be admitted as a taped recording, although evidence from the interrogation may be admitted in alternative forms subject to ordinary evidentiary rules. The Barnett rule applies because the defendant's case was not final and would be retried.
5. The defendant failed to establish a prima facie fair-cross-section violation because prospective jurors excused for economic hardship were not shown to constitute a distinctive group, and the record did not establish systematic underrepresentation.
6. The defendant did not demonstrate substantial noncompliance with RSA chapter 500-A or prejudice resulting from the excusal of prospective jurors for hardship.
7. The trial court did not violate due process or the right to an impartial judge by refusing to recuse itself where the record did not show that the alleged threats were credible, were taken seriously, or altered the court's procedures.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the denial of the defendant's timely, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request for self-representation during the first two days of trial was a structural constitutional error requiring a mistrial without prejudice and a new trial.
2. Whether the issue of a mistrial without prejudice was preserved when the defendant requested only dismissal with prejudice and objected to both a mistrial and continuation of the trial.
3. Whether the incomplete recording of the defendant's post-Miranda interrogation was admissible under State v. Barnett.
4. Whether excusing prospective jurors because of asserted economic hardship violated the constitutional fair-cross-section requirement or New Hampshire's jury-selection statutes.
5. Whether the juror-compensation scheme violated the State or Federal Constitution.
6. Whether the trial court was required to recuse itself because the defendant threatened court personnel.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded