Summary
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed and remanded an interlocutory order denying Janet MacElman's motions to dismiss an indictment for maintaining a common nuisance under RSA 318-B:16. The court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and that the indictment sufficiently alleged the offense under the State Constitution.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether RSA 318-B:16 is unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to MacElman.
- Whether RSA 318-B:16 is facially overbroad under the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions.
- Whether the indictment sufficiently alleged an offense under the New Hampshire Constitution.
Holdings
- RSA 318-B:16 is not unconstitutionally vague on its face because, read together with RSA 318-B:1, X and its knowingly requirement, it gives a person of ordinary intelligence adequate notice of the prohibited conduct and provides sufficient guidance against arbitrary enforcement.
- RSA 318-B:16 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to MacElman because the indictment and surrounding facts gave her adequate warning that knowingly maintaining a premises where heroin-dependent persons resorted to use heroin was prohibited.
- RSA 318-B:16 does not authorize or encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement because its definition of drug-dependent person supplies sufficient minimal enforcement guidelines, even though enforcement may require some degree of police judgment.
- RSA 318-B:16 is not facially overbroad because it does not prohibit a substantial amount of protected First Amendment activity in relation to its legitimate scope and primarily regulates conduct rather than speech or speech-related activity.
- The indictment was sufficient because it tracked the statute and identified the premises, the charged time period, the drug involved, and the conduct alleged, thereby informing MacElman of the charge and enabling her to prepare a defense and invoke double-jeopardy protection.
Key quotations
“A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; or (2) it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (1271)
“Although the legislature must establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, enforcement requires the exercise of some degree of police judgment.” (1273)
“The application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine to be employed only as a last resort.” (1274)
“The question is not whether the indictment could have been more certain and comprehensive, but whether it contains the elements of the offense and enough facts to warn the defendant of the specific charges against her.” (1275)
Factual background
MacElman was indicted for knowingly keeping or maintaining her home as a place resorted to by drug-dependent persons to use controlled drugs, including heroin. The indictment alleged conduct occurring between June 9, 2001, and September 7, 2002. The record indicated that two men died at the premises, one from acute intoxication caused by alcohol and opiates and the other from a heroin overdose.
Procedural history
MacElman was indicted for maintaining a common nuisance in violation of RSA 318-B:16. She moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute was facially and as-applied vague and overbroad, and that the indictment failed to state an offense under the New Hampshire Constitution. The Superior Court denied both motions, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire accepted the interlocutory appeal.
Remand instructions
The order denying the motions to dismiss was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.