Summary
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to representations made by learned professionals in connection with services rendered in their professional capacities. The court reversed an Appellate Division decision permitting CFA claims based on representations concerning the licensing and treatment of patients by physicians, while noting that professionals may remain subject to the Act when acting outside their professional capacities.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act applies to advertising representations made by a learned professional in connection with the rendering of professional medical services.
- Whether the existence of a separate regulatory scheme governing physicians affects the threshold question of whether the Consumer Fraud Act applies to professional medical services.
Holdings
- The Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to representations made by a learned professional while operating in the professional capacity of rendering professional services. Because Dr. Dello Russo's advertising representations concerned his professional medical services, the trial court correctly dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act claim against him.
- The existence of a separate regulatory scheme governing physicians is irrelevant to the threshold question whether the Consumer Fraud Act applies to learned professionals. The separate-regulatory-scheme analysis would become relevant only if the Act otherwise applied and the issue were preemption or conflict between regulatory schemes.
Key quotations
“We therefore must assume that the Legislature approves of the consistent judicial interpretation of the CFA that has been extant for four decades.” (242)
“That said, because Dr. Dello Russo's advertising representations were made in his professional capacity regarding his professional services, the trial court correctly dismissed the CFA claim against him.” (242)
Factual background
Joseph Macedo, Rosemary Lesky, and other similarly situated plaintiffs received laser eye treatment from defendants. They alleged that defendants represented that they would be treated by properly licensed physicians and that William T. Kellogg was fully licensed to provide the treatment, although he was not fully licensed. Plaintiffs did not allege substandard medical care or physical injury, but sought damages for mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, medical bills, and economic losses.
Procedural history
Plaintiffs sued physicians and related entities, alleging that defendants violated the Consumer Fraud Act by representing that plaintiffs would be treated by properly licensed physicians and that Dr. Kellogg was fully licensed to provide the treatment. The trial court dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act count because it concerned medical services outside the Act's scope. On leave to appeal, the Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded for disposition of the remaining issues.
Remand instructions
The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the case was remanded for disposition of the remaining issues.