Summary
This Appellate Division, First Department decision affirms the Supreme Court's denial of defendant Donna D. Piard's motion for summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff's negligence claim and her cross-claim against co-defendants. The court held that Piard failed to rebut the statutory presumption of vicarious liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) by offering only her own affidavit without corroborating testimony or evidence regarding the driver's consent. Additionally, the court found that Y&H Garages' affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the driver was acting within the scope of his employment. The opinion also addresses and rejects the appellant's argument that the law of the case doctrine applies based on a related but distinct action.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether summary judgment was proper to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence claim against Piard.
- Whether summary judgment was proper to dismiss Piard's cross‑claim against Y&H Garages.
- Whether the presumption of permission under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388[1] can be rebutted by Piard's affidavit alone.
Holdings
- Summary judgment was improper because Piard failed to rebut the statutory presumption that Matos was using her vehicle with express or implied permission and offered no substantial evidence beyond her own affidavit.
- Summary judgment was improper because the affidavit submitted by Y&H raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Matos was acting within the scope of his employment.
- The law of the case doctrine does not apply in this context.
Key quotations
“As the owner of the vehicle that crashed into the back of plaintiff's vehicle, Piard is liable for injuries to persons or property resulting from the negligent use or operation of her vehicle "by any person using or operating the same with [her] permission, express or implied" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388[1]).”
Factual background
Piard owned the vehicle that collided with the plaintiff's vehicle. At the time of the accident, Leonardo E. Matos was driving Piard's vehicle. The collision caused injuries to the plaintiff.
Procedural history
The Supreme Court, New York County denied Piard's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claim and on Piard's cross‑claim against Y&H Garages. Piard appealed that order to the Appellate Division, First Department.