Summary
This Appellate Division, Second Department decision affirms a lower court order that dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint against two defendants as time-barred under the statute of limitations and denied her motion for leave to enter a default judgment against a third defendant. The court held that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of stating a viable cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and did not raise triable issues of fact regarding tolling or timely commencement. Additionally, the court awarded costs to one respondent due to the plaintiff's inadequate appendix submission.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the plaintiff satisfied the burden to obtain a default judgment under CPLR 3215.
- Whether the motions to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(5) were proper because the causes of action were time‑barred.
Holdings
- The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment against Campos because she failed to meet her burden of stating a viable cause of action.
- The motions to dismiss were proper; the causes of action were barred by the one‑year statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to tolling or timely filing.
Key quotations
“On a motion for leave to enter a default judgment against a defendant based on the failure to answer or appear, a plaintiff must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the cause of action, and proof of the defendant's default.” (215 AD3d at 712)
“To demonstrate the facts constituting the cause of action, the plaintiff need only submit sufficient proof to enable a court to determine if the cause of action is viable, since defaulters are deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that flow from them. However, a court does not have a mandatory, ministerial duty to grant a motion for leave to enter a default judgment, and retains the discretionary obligation to determine whether the movant has met the burden of stating a viable cause of action.” (227 AD3d at 700-701)
Factual background
Barbetta sued Facchini, Marchesiello, Campos and another defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging conduct that occurred more than three years earlier. She filed an amended complaint and sought a default judgment against Campos. Facchini and Marchesiello moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a) asserting the statute of limitations had expired.
Procedural history
Barbetta filed an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, amended the complaint, moved for a default judgment against Campos, and the defendants moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a). The Supreme Court, Nassau County denied the default‑judgment motion and granted the dismissals. Barbetta appealed.