Summary
This New York Appellate Division decision reviews the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint alleging breach of an oral real property agreement, promissory estoppel, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and defamation. The court reversed the lower court's order, granting the motion to dismiss all causes of action. The appellate court held that the contract claims were barred by the statute of frauds due to insufficient written evidence and lack of unequivocal part performance. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts for promissory estoppel, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, or actionable defamation.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the breach of contract causes of action are barred by the statute of frauds.
- Whether the promissory estoppel claim can survive the statute of frauds.
- Whether a constructive trust may be imposed.
- Whether the unjust enrichment claim may proceed.
- Whether the alleged defamatory statements constitute actionable defamation or protected opinion.
Holdings
- The breach of contract causes of action are barred because the oral agreement to convey real property fails to satisfy the statute of frauds and is not saved by part performance.
- The promissory estoppel claim fails because the plaintiff did not allege an unconscionable injury; therefore the motion to dismiss should be granted.
- The constructive trust claim must be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to plead the requisite fiduciary relationship and other elements.
- The unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed because the lease expressly provides that improvements revert to the landlord, precluding recovery in quasi‑contract.
- The statements are non‑actionable opinion; the defamation claim must be dismissed.
Key quotations
“The statute of frauds prohibits the conveyance of real property without a written contract.” (at 1)
“[A]n agreement which violates the statute of frauds may nonetheless be enforceable where there has been part performance unequivocally referable to the contract by the party seeking to enforce the agreement.” (at 1)
“'Since falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only facts are capable be proven false, it follows that only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action.'” (at 1)
“'An expression of pure opinion is not actionable . . . , no matter how vituperative or unreasonable it may be.'” (at 1)
Factual background
The plaintiff, Adam Blank, claimed that Harold Acker promised to build and bequeath a house to him, that David Acker later reaffirmed the promise and agreed to transfer the house upon his death, and that Blank invested millions in renovating the house under a lease. In 2022 the defendants allegedly made false statements about Blank's management of a family trust, and later terminated the lease. The complaint asserted causes of action for specific performance, promissory estoppel, constructive trust, declaration of equitable ownership, breach of oral agreement, unjust enrichment, and defamation.
Procedural history
The Supreme Court, Nassau County denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department.