Summary
This Appellate Division decision reverses a lower court order granting motions to dismiss a complaint seeking to quiet title to real property and cancel a notice of pendency. The court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged constructive possession and a removable cloud on title due to an allegedly invalid 1996 deed that omitted certain legal heirs. Additionally, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the action was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations under CPLR 212(a) and RPAPL 311. Consequently, the motions to dismiss were denied.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action to quiet title under RPAPL article 15.
- Whether a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted on the basis of documentary evidence alone.
- Whether a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) may be granted when the complaint alleges the requisite elements of a quiet‑title action.
- Whether the action is barred by the ten‑year statute of limitations in CPLR 212(a) read with RPAPL 311.
Holdings
- A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) on the ground of documentary evidence may only be granted where the proffered documents utterly refute the plaintiff's allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law.
- On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts fit within any cognizable legal theory.
- The complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action to quiet title because it alleges the plaintiffs’ constructive possession and a removable cloud on title arising from the allegedly void 1996 deed.
- The action is not time‑barred because the plaintiffs, or their predecessors, possessed an interest within ten years of filing, and the plaintiff is presumed to have possessed the premises under RPAPL 311.
Key quotations
“A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) on the ground of documentary evidence may only be granted where the proffered documents utterly refute the plaintiff's allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law.” (at 89)
“On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in [the] complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory".” (at 474)
Factual background
Dorothy Anderson died intestate in 1995 leaving three surviving children, including Marilyn Burns, and two predeceased children whose descendants are plaintiffs James Gary and Eric Canty (the latter represented by Nahema Canty). In 1996 Burns executed a deed conveying the entire property to herself, omitting the plaintiffs’ interests. Burns later obtained a reverse mortgage from MERS. The complaint alleges the deed is void because Burns knew of the plaintiffs’ interests and that the reverse mortgage should be discharged.
Procedural history
The plaintiffs commenced a quiet‑title action in Kings County Supreme Court alleging that a 1996 deed conveyed sole title to Burns despite the plaintiffs’ vested interests as heirs of Dorothy Anderson. Burns and MERS moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a) and the trial court granted. The appellants appealed.
Remand instructions
The order of the Supreme Court, Kings County is reversed; the motions of Marilyn Burns and MERS to dismiss the complaint and to cancel the notice of pendency are denied.