Summary
This Appellate Division, Second Department decision affirms the Supreme Court's denial of a defendant's motion under CPLR 5015(a) to vacate a default judgment of divorce. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the more than six-year delay in seeking to set aside the judgment, rendering conclusory arguments insufficient. Consequently, the appellate court found no need to address whether a meritorious defense existed and affirmed the lower court's order with costs.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the defendant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the six‑year delay in moving to vacate the default judgment under CPLR 5015(a).
- Whether the court needed to consider the existence of a potentially meritorious defense after finding no reasonable excuse.
Holdings
- The appellate division affirmed the trial court's denial because the defendant failed to show a reasonable excuse for the delay.
- The court need not consider a potentially meritorious defense when a reasonable excuse is not shown.
Key quotations
“"Although the courts have adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions, it is still incumbent upon a defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense"”
“"In determining whether a reasonable excuse has been shown, a court should consider all the relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, prejudice to the opposing party, whether the default was willful, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits"”
Factual background
The parties were married in 1978. The plaintiff filed for divorce in 2014; the defendant was served by publication, failed to answer, and a default judgment was entered in 2016. Six years later, in 2023, the defendant sought to vacate that judgment, offering no reasonable excuse for the delay.
Procedural history
The parties married in 1978. In November 2014 the plaintiff commenced a divorce action. The defendant was served by publication and failed to answer, resulting in a default judgment of divorce entered on April 13, 2016. In March 2023 the defendant moved to vacate the judgment under CPLR 5015(a); the trial court denied the motion on August 22, 2023. The defendant appealed.