Tobin v. Grossman

24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969) · New York Court of Appeals · April 24, 1969

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals considers whether a mother may recover for her own mental and physical injuries resulting from shock and fear caused by the negligent injury of her child. The court holds that New York law does not recognize a cause of action for such indirect injuries, regardless of whether the plaintiff witnessed the accident, and affirms dismissal of the claim.

Court
New York Court of Appeals
Writing for the Court
Breitel, J.; Keating, J.
Jurisdiction
New York
Decision date
April 24, 1969
Procedural posture
Plaintiff appealed from an Appellate Division order reversing Special Term's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the mother's third cause of action for insufficiency.
Standard of review
On a motion addressed to the pleadings, allegations are accepted as true and the court determines whether they state a legally sufficient cause of action.
Precedential value
Published New York Court of Appeals majority opinion; binding New York appellate precedent.
Parties
Tobin v. Grossman
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

negligenceduty of carenegligent infliction of emotional distresspersonal injuryremedies

Practice areas

tortsnegligencepersonal injury

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a parent may recover for emotional and physical injuries caused by shock and fear resulting solely from serious injuries negligently inflicted on the parent's child.
  2. Whether the alleged cause of action is legally sufficient where the parent did not sustain physical impact and, on the facts revealed in pretrial examination, did not witness the accident itself.
  3. Whether New York tort law should extend a negligent actor's duty to a third person who is not the direct victim of the accident but suffers psychic injury from harm to a close relative.

Holdings

  1. Under New York law, no cause of action lies for unintended harm sustained by one person solely as a result of injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship between them.
  2. The allegation that the mother witnessed the accident did not establish a legally sufficient claim because New York would not adopt a rule allowing recovery for a nonvictim's psychic injury merely because the accident occurred within the mother's sensory and contemporaneous observation.

Key quotations

It is concluded that under the well-established applicable doctrines no cause of action lies for unintended harm sustained by one, solely as a result of injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship and whether the one was an eyewitness to the incident which resulted in the direct injuries. (609)
The question is profounder than that, because there is now urged the creation of a new duty and therefore an entirely new cause of action. (613)
It is enough that the law establishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally harmed. (619)

Factual background

Defendant allegedly negligently operated an automobile and struck plaintiff's two-year-old son, causing severe injuries, including cerebral damage. The mother alleged that the accident occurred in her full view and presence and that she suffered emotional and physical injuries from the shock and fear for her child. The pretrial examination showed that she was inside a nearby home, heard the screech of brakes, immediately went outside, and saw the injured child lying on the ground, but did not actually see the impact.

Procedural history

The mother pleaded that defendant negligently struck and severely injured her two-year-old son in an automobile accident occurring in her full view and presence, causing her emotional and physical injuries. Special Term denied defendant's motion to dismiss the third cause of action and later denied reargument. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the first order and dismissed the appeal from the denial of reargument. The Court of Appeals reviewed the pleading and the additional pretrial examination evidence contained in the record and affirmed the order dismissing the cause of action.

Court Document

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