Summary
The Appellate Division, First Department upheld an order authorizing the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from M.G., an intellectually and developmentally disabled person in a permanent vegetative state, pursuant to SCPA 1750-b. The court rejected an equal protection challenge arguing that M.G. should have received the same inquiry into prior end-of-life wishes available to a previously competent, nondisabled person under Public Health Law article 29-CC. It held that the differing statutory treatment was rationally related to legitimate state interests and consistent with Matter of Chantel Nicole R.
Holdings
- Applying SCPA 1750-b to M.G. did not violate equal protection because intellectually and developmentally disabled persons are not similarly situated to previously competent, non-disabled persons for purposes of end-of-life decision-making, and the different statutory treatment is rationally related to legitimate state interests.
- Although SCPA 1750-b makes the patient's best interests paramount, the best-interests analysis must be patient-centered and must consider the patient's wishes, including moral and religious beliefs, when those wishes are reasonably known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence.
- The statutory requirements for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment were satisfied because M.G. was permanently unconscious, had an irreversible medical condition requiring life-sustaining treatment, and continued treatment imposed an extraordinary burden with no meaningful prospect of recovery.
Questions Presented
- Whether applying SCPA 1750-b's best-interests standard to an intellectually and developmentally disabled person who had previously possessed some health care decision-making capacity, rather than Public Health Law article 29-CC's substituted-judgment framework, violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and New York Constitutions.
- Whether SCPA 1750-b requires consideration of the patient's known or reasonably ascertainable wishes, values, moral beliefs, and religious beliefs as part of the best-interests analysis.
- Whether the evidence established the statutory conditions authorizing withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, including permanent unconsciousness, irreversible medical condition, and extraordinary burden.
Disposition
affirmed
Cases Cited (12)
- Matter of Chantel Nicole R. (Pamela R.), 34 A.D.3d 99 (1st Dep't 2006), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 840 (2007)(followed)
- Matter of M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437 (2006)(followed)
- Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)(followed)
- Matter of Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981)(followed)
- Matter of Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517 (1988)(followed)
- Matter of Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218 (1990)(followed)
- Matter of M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437, 447 (2006)(followed)
- Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 369-370 (1981)(followed)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-448 (1985)(followed)
- Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-321 (1993)(followed)
Showing top 10 of 12.
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.