Summary
The Appellate Division, First Department reversed an order denying defendant Rafiq Kalam Id-Din’s motion to vacate a default judgment. The court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate compliance with CPLR 3215(g)(3)(i), because the summons was mailed to the defendant’s places of business rather than his residence and the plaintiff did not state that the residence was unknown.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the default judgment against Kalam Id-Din should be vacated because plaintiff failed to comply with CPLR 3215(g)(3)(i).
- Whether the plaintiff or the defaulting defendant bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff did not know the defendant's place of residence for purposes of CPLR 3215(g)(3).
Holdings
- A default judgment against Kalam Id-Din should be vacated because plaintiff failed to demonstrate compliance with CPLR 3215(g)(3)(i); mailing the summons to his places of business and failing to state that his residence was unknown was insufficient.
- The burden rests on the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff did not know the defendant's place of residence, rather than on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff knew the information.
Key quotations
“Contrary to plaintiff's contention, since CPLR 3215(g)(3) is meant to protect defendants, the burden should be on plaintiff to show that he did not know Kalam Id-Din's place of residence, not on Kalam Id-Din to prove that plaintiff knew this information.” ([*1])
Factual background
Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Rafiq Kalam Id-Din. In seeking the judgment, plaintiff mailed the summons to Kalam Id-Din's places of business, rather than to his residence, and did not state that Kalam Id-Din's place of residence was unknown.
Procedural history
The Supreme Court, New York County, denied Kalam Id-Din's motion to vacate the default judgment. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed on the law and granted the motion.