State v. Farook

2022-NCSC-59 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · May 6, 2022 · No. No. 457PA20

Summary

The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the trial court improperly admitted testimony from the defendant’s former attorney concerning defense strategy and the reasons for delay, violating the attorney-client privilege. The Court recognized that the more than six-year delay was presumptively prejudicial under the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial framework, but remanded for a rehearing because the State might present other evidence explaining the delay. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent it granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Holdings

  1. The trial court plainly erred by admitting testimony from Farook's former attorney concerning the attorney's strategy to delay the case and related confidential communications where Farook did not waive the attorney-client privilege.
  2. A delay exceeding six years is unreasonable and presumptively prejudicial for purposes of triggering the Barker inquiry and shifts to the State the burden of rebutting and explaining the delay.
  3. A criminal defendant may establish prejudice for a speedy-trial claim through either actual prejudice or presumptive prejudice; actual prejudice is not required in every case.
  4. The case must be remanded for the trial court to reconsider the speedy-trial claim using competent, nonprivileged evidence and the proper Barker analysis.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the trial court plainly erred by admitting testimony from Farook's former attorney concerning privileged communications and confidential trial strategy at the speedy-trial hearing.
  2. Whether the State could rely on privileged attorney testimony to explain the delay without a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
  3. Whether the trial court properly applied the Barker v. Wingo framework to the length and reasons for delay, assertion of the speedy-trial right, and prejudice.
  4. Whether a defendant may establish prejudice on a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim through actual or presumptive prejudice rather than proof of actual prejudice alone.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (21)

  • Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)(followed)
  • Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992)(followed)
  • State v. Farmer, 376 N.C. 407 (2020)(applied)
  • State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114 (2003)(applied)
  • State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674 (1994)(applied)
  • State v. Wilkerson, 257 N.C. App. 927 (2018)(applied)
  • Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973) (per curiam)(followed)
  • State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523 (1981)(applied)
  • Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)(followed)
  • State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C. 517 (1994)(applied)

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Cited In (0)

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