Gust v. State

2006 ND 114 (2006) · Supreme Court of North Dakota · June 1, 2006 · No. No. 20050381

Summary

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the denial of Tracy Gust’s application for post-conviction relief seeking credit for 203 days of custody rather than the 9 days credited in his criminal judgment. The court held that the additional custody resulted from revocation of parole on an earlier offense and that granting credit against both matters would constitute impermissible double credit under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02(2).

Court
Supreme Court of North Dakota
Writing for the Court
Kapsner, Justice; Carol Ronning Kapsner; Mary Muehlen Maring; Daniel J. Crothers; Dale V. Sandstrom; Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
Jurisdiction
North Dakota
Decision date
June 1, 2006
Docket number
No. 20050381
Procedural posture
Gust appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief seeking an additional 194 days of credit against his sentence, beyond the 9 days already credited.
Standard of review
The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing entitlement to additional credit for time served; the court reviewed the district court's credit calculation under the governing statutory and case-law standards.
Precedential value
Published opinion; precedential
Parties
Tracy Gust v. State of North Dakota
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

post-conviction reliefsentence modificationsentencingcriminal procedure

Practice areas

Criminal lawPost-conviction reliefSentencing and credit for time served

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Gust was entitled to credit against his sentence for the period he remained incarcerated after his parole was revoked and before sentencing on the new criminal charges.
  2. Whether awarding credit for that entire period would improperly duplicate credit attributable to the separate parole-revocation matter.

Holdings

  1. A defendant may receive credit only for time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which the sentence was imposed or the conduct underlying that charge; time attributable to a separate parole revocation or unrelated charge cannot also be credited against the new sentence.
  2. Gust failed to affirmatively establish entitlement to credit for the additional 194 days because the record showed that period was attributable to his parole revocation rather than the new criminal charges.

Key quotations

Credit against any sentence to a term of imprisonment must be given by the court to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which the sentence was imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such charge was based. (¶ 6)

Factual background

Gust was arrested for possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia while on parole from an earlier offense. He remained in custody after failing to post bond, but his parole on the earlier offense was revoked nine days after his arrest, after which he served time on the parole revocation. When he later pleaded guilty to the new charges, the criminal judgment credited him with 9 days of time served, and he sought credit for the entire 203-day period before sentencing.

Procedural history

Gust was arrested on May 18, 2004, pleaded guilty on December 9, 2004, and received a mandatory minimum five-year sentence with credit for 9 days served. He filed an application for post-conviction relief seeking credit for 203 days and initially alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but withdrew the ineffective-assistance claim at the evidentiary hearing. The district court denied additional credit, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Court Document

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