Summary
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded a district court order suppressing blood-test evidence in a driving-under-the-influence prosecution. The court held that reading an implied consent advisory describing administrative license-suspension penalties does not render consent to a blood test per se involuntary; voluntariness must be determined under the totality of the circumstances.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the State's appeal from the suppression order was authorized under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(5).
- Whether the district court erred by treating Fleckenstein's consent to a blood test as per se involuntary based solely on the implied-consent advisory rather than determining voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances.
Holdings
- The State could appeal because it complied with N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(5) by filing the required prosecuting attorney's statement asserting that the appeal was not taken for delay and that the suppressed evidence was substantial proof of a material fact.
- Consent to a blood test is not per se involuntary merely because an officer accurately reads an implied-consent advisory describing administrative penalties for refusal. Voluntariness must be determined under the totality of the circumstances.
Key quotations
“Because the district court misapplied the law by ruling Fleckenstein’s consent to a blood test was per se involuntary and thus did not consider the totality of the circumstances, we reverse the district court’s order and remand for additional findings of fact and a determination of voluntariness on the basis of the totality of the circumstances.” (¶ 1)
“An accurate advisory does not by itself compel the conclusion that consent was not voluntary. In all cases, the totality of the circumstances must be considered.” (¶ 9)
Factual background
A deputy stopped Fleckenstein after his vehicle touched the center line and observed bloodshot eyes and an admission that Fleckenstein had consumed a few beers. After field sobriety testing and a preliminary breath test indicating an alcohol level above the legal limit, the deputy arrested Fleckenstein, read him the Miranda warning and an implied-consent advisory, and obtained his consent to a blood test. The advisory stated that North Dakota law required a chemical test and described license-revocation consequences for refusal, but did not state that refusal was a crime.
Procedural history
Fleckenstein was charged with third-offense driving under the influence and moved to suppress blood-test evidence obtained after he consented to testing. The district court found the consent involuntary and suppressed the evidence. The State appealed after filing the prosecuting attorney's statement required for an appeal from an order suppressing evidence.
Remand instructions
The district court must make additional findings of fact and determine the voluntariness of Fleckenstein's consent to the blood test based on the totality of the circumstances.