Musson v. Newton Falls

Summary

The Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of David Lynch’s motion for summary judgment asserting political-subdivision employee immunity under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2744. The court held that the immunity appeal was properly reviewable, declined to address the merits of the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim under the limited scope of review, and concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding immunity. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed and the matter was remanded for trial.

Holdings

1. An order denying a political-subdivision employee's motion for summary judgment based on immunity is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2744.02(C).
2. In an appeal under R.C. 2744.02(C), the court may review only alleged errors involving the denial of the benefit of immunity and may not decide the underlying merits of the intentional tort claim.
3. A political-subdivision employee acts manifestly outside the scope of employment when the employee's actions bear no relationship to the conduct of the political subdivision's business; whether that exception applies is generally a question of fact.
4. Genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Lynch acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, precluding summary judgment on employee immunity.
5. Musson was not estopped from asserting that an exception to employee immunity applied merely because her complaint alleged that Lynch acted within the scope of his employment.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the denial of Lynch's motion for summary judgment based on political-subdivision employee immunity was a final, appealable order.
2. Whether the appellate court could review the merits of Musson's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim in an appeal limited to the denial of immunity.
3. Whether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Lynch's conduct fell within an exception to employee immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), including conduct manifestly outside the scope of employment or undertaken with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
4. Whether Musson was equitably estopped from asserting that an exception to employee immunity applied because her complaint alleged Lynch acted within the scope of his employment.

Disposition

affirmed