Summary
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's sentencing entry that prohibited the defendant from participating in the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's transitional control program. The appellate court held that transitional control is not a criminal sanction imposed by the sentencing court and that the trial court lacked statutory authority to disapprove it at sentencing. The case was remanded for the trial court to correct its sentencing entry.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a trial court has legal authority to prohibit or disapprove a defendant's participation in Ohio's transitional control program at the time of sentencing, before the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction provides the statutory notice required by R.C. 2967.26(A)(2).
- Whether the trial court's sentencing-entry prohibition on transitional control was clearly and convincingly contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).
Holdings
- Transitional control is not part of the criminal sentence because it is not a sanction or penalty imposed by the sentencing court on an offender as punishment for the offense; it is a separate program administered by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction after incarceration.
- The trial court lacked statutory authority to prohibit Talbert's participation in transitional control at sentencing, before the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction provided notice under R.C. 2967.26(A)(2). The statutory notice-and-disapproval procedure is the exclusive means by which the court may disapprove a qualifying transfer.
Key quotations
“The trial court exceeded its legal authority by prohibiting Appellant’s participation in the transitional control program.” (¶ 4)
“Therefore, transitional control is not a “sanction . . . imposed by the sentencing court on an offender who . . . pleads guilty to an offense.”” (¶ 29)
“Courts have no inherent discretion with respect to the composition of a criminal sentence.” (¶ 32)
“Since no statute authorizes the trial court to disapprove transitional control under any other circumstances, then R.C. 2967.26 necessarily provides the exclusive means.” (¶ 35)
“That portion of the trial court’s judgment is reversed. This case is remanded for the trial court to correct its sentencing entry in accordance with this opinion.” (¶ 39)
Factual background
Talbert pleaded guilty to illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility, as an amended fourth-degree felony, and possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-degree felony. The trial court imposed consecutive prison terms of 17 and 10 months, for an aggregate 27-month term, consecutive to a sentence in another case. Based on Talbert's criminal history, prior prison terms, rejection from NEOCAP, and perceived high risk of reoffending, the trial court prohibited him from participating in transitional control and other programs intended to shorten or modify service of the sentence.
Procedural history
Talbert was indicted on felony drug-related offenses, pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to an amended fourth-degree felony and a fifth-degree felony, and was sentenced to an aggregate consecutive prison term of 27 months, consecutive to a sentence in another case. The trial court also prohibited participation in transitional control and other early-release or alternative-housing programs. The Eleventh District granted leave for a delayed appeal, reversed the portion of the sentencing judgment concerning transitional control, and remanded for correction of the sentencing entry.
Remand instructions
The trial court must correct its sentencing entry by removing the prohibition on Talbert's participation in the transitional control program, consistent with the opinion.