State v. Myers

97 Ohio St. 3d 335 (2002) · Supreme Court of Ohio · December 13, 2002

Summary

The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed David L. Myers's convictions for the aggravated murder of Amanda Maher and his death sentence. The court rejected his claims concerning pre-indictment delay, statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights, and other propositions of law, and affirmed the convictions and sentence.

Court
Supreme Court of Ohio
Writing for the Court
Pfeifer, J.; Moyer, C.J.; Douglas, J.; Resnick, J.; F.E. Sweeney, J.; Cook, J.; Lundberg Stratton, J.
Jurisdiction
Ohio
Decision date
December 13, 2002
Procedural posture
Appeal as of right from the affirmance by the Ohio Court of Appeals of Myers's aggravated-murder conviction and death sentence.
Standard of review
Speedy-trial claims were reviewed under the Ohio statutory speedy-trial provisions and the Barker v. Wingo constitutional balancing test. Evidentiary and photograph-admission rulings were reviewed for abuse of discretion; unpreserved claims were reviewed for plain error. Sufficiency was reviewed under whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Ineffective-assistance claims were reviewed under Strickland v. Washington.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
David L. Myers v. State of Ohio
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal procedurespeedy trialsentencingevidencedue process

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedurecapital punishmentevidenceconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the delay between the original indictment, nolle prosequi, reindictment, and trial violated Myers's statutory or constitutional speedy-trial rights.
  2. Whether the prosecution's preindictment delay violated due process.
  3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting Myers's statement concerning cocaine, evidence seized from his automobile, other-acts testimony, photographs, deposition testimony, and alleged victim-impact evidence.
  4. Whether the second grand-jury indictment was invalid because of alleged grand-juror bias.
  5. Whether voir-dire procedures violated Myers's right to an impartial capital sentencing jury.
  6. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated-murder conviction and robbery specification.
  7. Whether the jury instructions, prosecutorial argument, sentencing procedures, or readmission of exhibits required reversal.
  8. Whether trial or appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
  9. Whether Ohio's death-penalty statutes were unconstitutional as applied or on the grounds asserted.

Holdings

  1. Myers failed to establish that the State intentionally or improperly delayed the second indictment to gain a tactical advantage or that the delay caused actual prejudice; the due-process claim was rejected.
  2. Myers was brought to trial within the time required by R.C. 2945.71, and the nolle-prosequi-to-reindictment period and defense-requested or otherwise properly tolled delays were not chargeable to the State.
  3. Myers was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
  4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Myers's statement that cocaine could make a person do anything to obtain it.
  5. The trial court properly denied Myers's Franks challenge to the search warrant affidavit.
  6. Evidence of Reagin's prior sexual assault was admissible to establish identity through modus operandi and did not constitute reversible error.
  7. The evidence was sufficient to support Myers's aggravated-murder conviction and the associated aggravated-robbery specification.
  8. The aggravating circumstance that Myers committed the murder during an aggravated robbery outweighed the mitigating evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the death sentence was appropriate and proportionate.
  9. The trial court erred by failing to personally address Myers before sentencing and offer him the opportunity for allocution, but the error was harmless.
  10. Myers failed to establish ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel.

Key quotations

In balancing the four Barker factors in this case, we hold that Myers was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. (346-347)
The trial court’s failure to personally address Myers prior to sentencing and allow him to make a statement constituted error under Reynolds and Campbell. (358)
Upon independent weighing, we find that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. (365)
The death penalty in this case is both appropriate and proportionate when compared with capital cases combining murder with aggravated robbery. (365)

Factual background

Amanda Maher was found barely alive beside railroad tracks after leaving a bar with Myers following the arrest of her boyfriend. She had suffered severe head trauma from a railroad spike, attempted strangulation, and insertion of three stones into her vaginal canal. Witnesses placed Myers with Maher shortly before the attack, and police later found Maher's and her boyfriend's wallets in Myers's vehicle. Forensic evidence, statements attributed to Myers, and testimony concerning a similar prior sexual assault supported the prosecution's case.

Procedural history

Myers was indicted for Amanda Maher's aggravated murder in 1988. The charge was nolled in 1991 while the investigation continued, and Myers was later reindicted in 1993. After numerous defense-requested continuances, a jury convicted him of aggravated murder and recommended death; the trial court imposed the death penalty. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment after reviewing Myers's 32 propositions of law and independently reviewing the death sentence.

Court Document

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