Summary
The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio's statutory speedy-trial periods under R.C. 2945.71 do not apply when an appellate court vacates a conviction entered after a no-contest plea and remands the case for further proceedings. In that circumstance, the applicable time limit is governed by the federal and Ohio constitutional rights to a speedy trial, assessed under the Barker v. Wingo factors. The court held that Hull's trial 149 days after remand was constitutionally reasonable and affirmed her conviction.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether R.C. 2945.71 applies when an appellate court vacates a first-degree misdemeanor conviction entered pursuant to a no-contest plea and remands the case for further proceedings.
- If the statutory speedy-trial period does not apply, whether a trial conducted 149 days after remand violated Hull's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Holdings
- R.C. 2945.71 applies to bringing a person to trial after arrest or service of summons, but it does not apply to a criminal conviction that has been overturned on appeal and remanded for further proceedings after a no-contest plea.
- When an appellate court vacates a first-degree misdemeanor conviction entered after a no-contest plea and remands for further proceedings, adjudication 149 days after remand is not presumptively prejudicial and is constitutionally reasonable under the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
Key quotations
“Because the statute is silent as to this circumstance, we are not in a position either to add language to the statute or to surmise legislative intent.” (at 187)
“R.C. 2945.71 does not apply to criminal convictions that have been overturned on appeal.” (at 188)
“The time limit for bringing a person charged with a crime whose conviction has been overturned on appeal is governed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” (at 188)
Factual background
On October 13, 2001, a State Highway Patrol trooper stopped Hull for speeding and observed an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, confusion, difficulty steadying herself, and failures on three field sobriety tests. A breath test showed a concentration of .120 grams per 210 liters of breath, and she was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. After her no-contest conviction was vacated because of the trial court's failure to obtain an explanation of the circumstances, Hull was retried 149 days after remand and convicted by a jury.
Procedural history
Hull was arrested and charged with first-degree misdemeanor operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. After the trial court denied her suppression motion, she pleaded no contest; the court of appeals vacated the conviction because the trial court had not obtained an explanation of the circumstances surrounding the offense as required by R.C. 2937.07. On remand, Hull moved to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, but the trial court denied the motion and a jury convicted her. The Seventh District affirmed, held that R.C. 2945.71 did not apply, and certified a conflict with State v. Parker. The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the certified conflict and discretionary appeal and affirmed.