State v. Parker, 113 Ohio St. 3d 207

863 N.E.2d 1032 (Ohio 2007) · Supreme Court of Ohio · April 18, 2007

Summary

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that when multiple charges arise from the same criminal incident and share a common litigation history, pretrial incarceration on those charges constitutes incarceration on the pending charge for purposes of Ohio's triple-count speedy-trial provision, R.C. 2945.71(E). The court affirmed the appellate judgment in favor of Parker and adopted the rule stated in State v. Parsley.

Court
Supreme Court of Ohio
Writing for the Court
O'Connor, J.; Moyer, C.J.; French, J.; Pfeifer, J.; Lanzinger, J.; Lundberg Stratton, J.; O'Donnell, J.
Jurisdiction
Ohio
Decision date
April 18, 2007
Procedural posture
The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Eleventh District Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's denial of Parker's motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.
Standard of review
De novo review of the interpretation and application of Ohio's statutory speedy-trial provisions
Precedential value
Published and precedential decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
Parties
State of Ohio v. Jeremy Parker
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

speedy trialcriminal procedurestatutory interpretationsixth amendmentfourteenth amendment

Practice areas

criminal procedurespeedy trialstatutory interpretationconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Ohio's triple-count provision, R.C. 2945.71(E), applies when multiple charges arise from the same criminal incident and share a common litigation history, even though some charges are prosecuted in different courts.
  2. Whether Parker's pretrial incarceration on the jointly arising felony and misdemeanor charges constituted incarceration solely on a pending charge for purposes of the triple-count provision.

Holdings

  1. When multiple charges arise from a criminal incident and share a common litigation history, pretrial incarceration on the multiple charges constitutes incarceration on the pending charge for purposes of R.C. 2945.71(E), even when the charges are prosecuted in separate jurisdictions.
  2. Because the triple-count provision applied to Parker's 79 days of incarceration, he was entitled to the statutory speedy-trial credit recognized by the court of appeals, and the denial of his motion to dismiss was properly reversed.

Key quotations

We therefore adopt the Parsley ruling and hold that when multiple charges arise from a criminal incident and share a common litigation history, pretrial incarceration on the multiple charges constitutes incarceration on the “pending charge” for the purposes of the triple-count provision of the speedy-trial statute, R.C. 2945.71(E). (at 211)
Criminal charges arising out of the same criminal incident and brought simultaneously will always be deemed to have a “common litigation history” for the purposes of establishing incarceration solely on the “pending charge” within the meaning of R.C. 2945.71(E), even if they are prosecuted in separate jurisdictions. (at 212)

Factual background

Parker was arrested on November 6, 2002, after the discovery of a methamphetamine laboratory and was charged with illegal manufacture of drugs, possession of drugs, and carrying a concealed weapon. The charges arose from the same criminal incident and were initially filed together in municipal court. The felony charges were bound over to common pleas court, while the misdemeanor remained in municipal court, and Parker remained jailed because the two courts imposed different bond requirements. He was incarcerated for 79 days before posting a personal recognizance bond on the felony charges.

Procedural history

Parker was charged in municipal court with two felonies and a misdemeanor arising from the same incident. The felony charges were bound over to the common pleas court, while the misdemeanor remained in municipal court; Parker remained incarcerated because of conflicting bond requirements. The trial court denied his speedy-trial motion, and Parker entered a no-contest plea. The Eleventh District reversed, holding that the triple-count provision applied. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.

Court Document

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