State v. Sterling

113 Ohio St. 3d 255 (Ohio 2007) · Supreme Court of Ohio · May 2, 2007

Summary

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that R.C. 2953.82(D), which made a prosecutor’s disagreement with an eligible inmate’s request for DNA testing final and nonappealable and barred courts from ordering testing without prosecutorial agreement, violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The court concluded that the provision improperly restricted judicial authority over matters affecting the determination of guilt. It severed subsection (D), affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.

Court
Supreme Court of Ohio
Writing for the Court
O'Donnell, J.; Moyer, C.J.; Gallagher, J.; Pfeifer, J.; Lundberg Stratton, J.; Lanzinger, J.; Gallagher, J., assigned
Jurisdiction
Ohio
Decision date
May 2, 2007
Procedural posture
The State of Ohio appealed the Ashtabula County Court of Appeals' determination that R.C. 2953.82(D) violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted discretionary review of the statute's constitutionality.
Standard of review
De novo review of the constitutionality of a statute
Precedential value
Published opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio; precedential
Parties
State of Ohio v. Cameron Sterling
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

separation of powersconstitutional lawcriminal procedureevidencepost-conviction relief

Practice areas

constitutional lawcriminal procedurepost-conviction DNA testingseparation of powers

Questions Presented

  1. Whether R.C. 2953.82(D), which makes a prosecutor's disagreement with an eligible inmate's DNA-testing request final and unreviewable and bars a court from ordering testing without prosecutorial agreement, violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.
  2. Whether the unconstitutional portions of R.C. 2953.82(D) may be severed from the remainder of the statute.

Holdings

  1. R.C. 2953.82(D) is unconstitutional because its provisions making a prosecutor's disagreement with an inmate's DNA-testing request final and unappealable, and depriving courts of authority to order testing without prosecutorial agreement, improperly interfere with judicial authority.
  2. R.C. 2953.82(D) is severable from the remainder of R.C. 2953.82.

Key quotations

the legislature, however, may not impede the judiciary in its province to determine guilt in a criminal matter — and DNA testing results affect that issue — nor can it delegate to the executive branch of government the power to exercise judicial authority. (261)
Accordingly, R.C. 2953.82(D) violates the doctrine of separation of powers and is therefore unconstitutional. (261)
Striking subsection (D) from R.C. 2953.82, which delegates judicial authority to the executive branch of government, meets the Geiger test (262)

Factual background

In 1990, Cameron Sterling forcibly raped a child under thirteen. He later entered an Alford plea to an amended rape charge without the force specification and received a six-to-twenty-five-year prison sentence. In 2003, Sterling requested DNA testing, asserting that semen had been recovered during the investigation and that DNA specimens had been collected from him but never compared. The prosecutor opposed the request, and the trial court denied it.

Procedural history

Sterling pleaded guilty under an Alford plea to an amended rape charge and was sentenced by the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. More than twelve years later, he sought DNA testing under R.C. 2953.82; the prosecutor disagreed and the trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals held subsection (D) unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.

Remand instructions

The matter was remanded to the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court may exercise judicial authority to determine the DNA-testing request, subject to appropriate appellate review, after subsection (D) is severed.

Court Document

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